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CRIMINALIZING THE CLASSROOM
 On February 1, 2010 school safety officers arrested twelve-year-old Alexa 
Gonzalez in front of her classmates and teachers.1 What did she do wrong? While 
waiting for her Junior High School Spanish teacher to distribute homework 
assignments, Alexa doodled on her desk with an erasable marker, “I love my friends 
Abby and Faith. Lex was here. 2/1/10.”2 She finished the doodle with a smiley face. 
In response, school safety officers from the New York City Police Department 
(NYPD) pulled Alexa out of school in handcuffs.3
 What happened to Alexa, unfortunately, is not an isolated incident, but part of a 
national pattern of schools relying on exclusionary discipline, police tactics, and 
criminal punishments to address even the slightest kind of misbehavior by students. 
In the 1990s, federal, state, and local policymakers began to institute tough 
disciplinary and safety policies mandating that schools respond to student misconduct 
through suspensions and arrests. While such zero tolerance policies first focused on 
situations involving drug or gun possession, they soon expanded to all types of 
student misbehavior. As a result, schools, and the newly stationed police forces 
within them, began to increasingly rely on student removals and referrals to the 
juvenile and criminal justice systems to handle school disciplinary problems, 
including for non-dangerous and non-criminal offenses. This took place despite data 
that indicated that violence in the schools was actually decreasing, and despite the 
growing evidence of the ineffectiveness and harmful impact of student suspensions 
and arrests on the entire school community.
 Similar to this national trend, and sometimes serving as a model for the nation, 
New York City schools have increased their reliance on police personnel and zero 
tolerance policies to maintain safety in schools. As a result, New York City schools 
are now patrolled on a daily basis by the fifth largest police force in the nation, and 
every day in New York City schools, students are stopped, searched, summonsed, or 
arrested by poorly trained and inadequately supervised police personnel. Moreover, 
the number of suspensions handed down on an annual basis has increased by 132% 
under Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg.4 Children of color from low-income families 
have borne the brunt of both of these practices.5
1. Rachel Monahan, Queens Girl Alexa Gonzalez Gets Hauled out of School in Handcuffs After Getting Caught 
for Doodling on a Desk, N.Y. Daily News, Feb. 5, 2010, available at http://articles.nydailynews.
com/2010-02-05/local/27055388_1_desk-doodling-handcuffs; Stephanie Chen, Girl ’s Arrest for 
Doodling Raises Concerns About Zero Tolerance, CNN (Feb. 18, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-
18/justice/new.york.doodle.arrest_1_zero-tolerance-schools-police-precinct?_s=PM:CRIME; Edecio 
Martinez, NYC Middle Schooler Alexa Gonzalez Arrested, Handcuffed. . . for Doodling!, CBS News (Feb. 
8, 2010, 6:30 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-6173466-504083.html.
2. Monahan, supra note 1; Chen, supra note 1; Martinez, supra note 1.
3. Monahan, supra note 1; Chen, supra note 1; Martinez, supra note 1.
4. Johanna Miller, Udi Ofer, Alexander Artz, Tara Bahl, Tara Foster, Deinya Phenix, Nick 
Sheehan & Holly A. Thomas, NYCLU and Student Safty Coal., Education Interrupted: The 
Growing Use of Suspensions in New York City’s Public Schools 15 (2011) [hereinafter NYCLU 
Suspensions Report].
5. See Elora Mukherjee, NYCLU & ACLU, Criminalizing the Classroom: The Over-Policing 
of New York City Schools (2007) [hereinafter Criminalizing the Classroom Report]; see also 
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 While an orderly and safe classroom is vital for an adequate learning environment 
for both children and educators, the goal of a safe school should not be synonymous 
with stacking the halls with police personnel and doling out excessive punishments. 
On the contrary, the goal of safety should complement and enhance the overarching 
purpose of a school: to provide all students with a quality education. Yet this right is 
all too often threatened by overzealous policies that rely on gut reactions rather than 
evidence-driven solutions.
 The growing reliance by schools on policing tactics and exclusionary discipline to 
address misbehavior on its own raises significant concerns. But it is even more 
disconcerting given the availability of proven alternatives to securing the school 
environment that avoid the collateral consequences resulting from arrests and school 
removals. Positive behavioral interventions and supports, restorative justice practices, 
and other common-sense alternatives have been proven to reduce misbehavior and 
lead to greater educational achievements. Yet current safety and discipline practices 
in many of the nation’s schools, including in its largest school district, New York 
City, largely ignore such alternatives and instead continue to rely on police tactics 
and exclusionary discipline to maintain safety.
 Part I of this article reviews the growth of zero tolerance policies in our nation’s 
schools. Part II chronicles the growth of policing and suspension practices in New 
York City, and documents the ways in which Mayor Bloomberg has greatly expanded 
on policies first implemented by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani to rely on law enforcement 
tactics and exclusionary discipline to address student misbehavior. Part III provides a 
critique of zero tolerance policies and documents the ineffectiveness of these measures, 
including the contribution to a negative school climate. Part IV provides numerous 
examples of schools replacing zero tolerance policies with graduated systems of 
discipline that recognize early intervention and moderate responses to misbehavior. 
The article concludes with a set of recommendations.
I. NATIONAL GROWTH OF ZERO TOLERANCE IN SCHOOLS
 In the late 1980s, school districts began to adopt zero tolerance policies to address 
drug and gang problems.6 In the 1994 reauthorization of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965, Congress passed the Gun-Free Schools Act, which 
required that states that receive federal education funding adopt laws that mandate a 
NYCLU Suspensions Report, supra note 4.
6. Russell Skiba et al., Am. Psychological Ass’n, Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in the 
Schools?: An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations 23 (2006) [hereinafter APA Report]. 
The use of severe and mandatory punishments to address socially unacceptable behavior, including 
unlawful behavior, did not originate in the school context. In the 1980s, federal drug law policy began to 
adopt a zero tolerance approach to address the sale and distribution of drugs. See “Zero Tolerance” Drug 
Policy and Confiscation of Property: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard & Navigation of the H. 
Comm. on Merch. Marine & Fisheries, 100th Cong. 3 (1988) (statement of Hon. Earl Hutto, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation) (Republican and Democratic lawmakers criticizing the 
unfair consequences of the administration’s zero tolerance policy to seize vessels found with even the 
smallest amount of drugs); see also Russell Skiba, Zero Tolerance, Zero Evidence: An Analysis of 
School Disciplinary Practice 2 (2000) [hereinafter Zero Tolerance, Zero Evidence].
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one-year expulsion and referral to the criminal or juvenile justice system of any student 
who brings a weapon to school.7 The law permitted some flexibility by mandating 
that the same state laws authorize each local educational agency to modify the 
expulsion mandate on a case-by-case basis.8 Passage of the Gun-Free Schools Act 
signaled an important validation of zero tolerance school discipline practices by the 
federal government,9 and school districts throughout the nation reacted by adopting 
policies not only to address weapon possession but general misbehavior as well.
 While the movement towards adoption of zero tolerance policies was gaining 
traction, a national tragedy took place that secured the proliferation of such policies 
in school districts. On April 20, 1999, two students at Columbine High School in 
Colorado killed twelve students and one teacher and injured twenty-three others in 
school.10 The tragic incident increased pressure on school districts throughout the 
nation to implement tough security measures as parents and policymakers were left 
with the wrongful impression that school violence was out-of-control.11
 While there are few systemic studies about the current prevalence of zero tolerance 
policies across the nation, such policies appear to be the norm in schools, both 
according to the few studies that have been published and to the prevalence of news 
stories about the consequences of such policies.12 Stories of the extreme application of 
zero tolerance now appear regularly in the media, including stories of children getting 
7. Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103382, 108 Stat. 3518, §§ 14601–603 (codified 
as amended in 20 U.S.C. § 8921); see also Gun-Free Schools Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (2006). 
8. 20 U.S.C. § 7151(b)(1).
9. Speaking on the one-year anniversary of passage of the Act, President Clinton said, “Today, almost one 
year after I signed the Gun-Free Schools Act, I’m very pleased to announce that our message of zero 
tolerance has been made a reality around the country.” Presidential Statement on the Gun Free Schools 
Act, 31 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1944 (Oct. 26, 1995), available at http://www.govrecords.org/
pd30oc95-message-to-the-congress-on-sanctions-against-15.html.
10. See Judith Graham & Bob Secter, Massacre Shatters School, ‘A Suicide Mission’: 2 Gunmen in Black Leave 
Possibly 25 Dead; Student Describes Terror: ‘He Put the Gun . . . in My Face’; Clinton Seeks Action: ‘Perhaps Now 
America Will Wake Up,’ Chi. Trib., Apr. 21, 1999, at 1; Tom Kenworthy, Police: Attack Planned in Detail; 15 
Dead, 28 Hurt in Rampage, Wash. Post, Apr. 22, 1999, at A01; Sam Howe Verhovek, Terror in Littleton: 
The Overview; 15 Bodies Are Removed from School in Colorado, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1999, at A1.
11. In fact, national data indicated that school violence was on a significant decline since 1992. A 1999 report 
by the U.S. Department of Justice and Department of Education attempted to alleviate the worries of 
parents and remind them that violence in the schools, despite the Columbine shooting, was down: “The 
vast majority of America’s schools are safe places. In fact, notwithstanding the disturbing reports of 
violence in our schools, they are becoming even safer. But the fears of students, teachers and parents are 
real.” U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Annual Report on School Safety (1999). 
According to Justice Department statistics, from 1992 to 2004 the violent crime rates at school dropped 
by fifty-four percent. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Serious Violent Crime at School Continues 
to Fall (Dec. 3, 2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2006/BJS07004.htm.
12. A survey conducted by the National Center on Education Statistics between 1996 and 1997 found that 
between seventy-nine and ninety-four percent of public schools had in place zero tolerance policies. The 
survey defined zero tolerance “as a school or district policy that mandates predetermined consequences 
or punishments for specific offenses.” Ninety-four percent of public schools reported having in place a 
zero tolerance policy for firearms, ninety-one percent for weapons other than firearms, eighty-eight 
percent for drugs, eighty-seven percent for alcohol, seventy-nine percent for violence, and seventy-nine 
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expelled, handcuffed, or arrested for small infractions or in absurd situations, such as 
a four-year-old who was handcuffed for failing to take a nap or an eleven-year-old 
who was charged with criminal theft of a lollipop.13
 As a disciplinary approach, zero tolerance mandates that certain behaviors trigger 
severe responses, regardless of mitigating circumstances. This approach almost 
always begins with removal of the child from the classroom, and often removal from 
school, including removal through an arrest.14 Zero tolerance schools impose 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
disrespectful behavior and writing on a desk to drug use and weapon possession.
 Proponents of zero tolerance believe that such policies send a strong message to 
potential offenders that misbehavior will be treated seriously and severely, therefore 
dissuading wrongdoers from acting out in the first place and thus serving as a deterrent.15 
percent for tobacco. Sheila Heaviside et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stats., 
Violence and Discipline Problems in U.S. Public Schools: 1996–97 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Denise Buffa, Public Enemy No. 1—City Sued for Cuffing 4-Yr.-Old Nap Nixers, N.Y. Post, Mar. 
10, 2008, at 15 (reporting on two four-year-old children who were handcuffed by NYPD school safety 
officers for refusing to take a nap at school and similar incidents in the past); Sharif Durhams, Tosa East 
Student Arrested, Fined After Repeated Texting, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Feb. 18, 2009, at B8 (A school 
resource officer arrested a fourteen-year-old girl for text messaging in school. The girl refused to stop 
text messaging after being asked to stop by her teacher. The student was arrested and given a $298 fine 
for disorderly conduct.); Editorial, Educational Intolerance, St. Petersburg Times, May 14, 2001, 
http://www.sptimes.com/News/051401/Opinion/Educational_intoleran.shtml (reporting on the 
expulsion of a ten-year-old girl who found a small knife in her lunchbox, placed there by her mother so 
the girl could cut an apple); Bob Herbert, 6-Year-Olds Under Arrest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2007, at A17 
(Police officers handcuffed and arrested six-year-old Desre’e Watson for throwing a temper tantrum in 
kindergarten class. According to the police department, “Watson was upset and crying and wailing and 
would not leave the classroom to let them study, causing a disruption of the normal class activities.” 
Desre’e was taken to central booking, fingerprinted, photographed, and charged with battery against a 
school official, which is a felony, and two misdemeanors. A month before this incident, in Baltimore the 
police arrested a 7-year-old boy for riding a dirt bike on a sidewalk.); Cindy Rodriguez, $1 Candy Theft 
a Misdemeanor?, Denv. Post, Apr. 5, 2005, at F1 (reporting about an eleven-year-old charged with theft 
after he took a lollipop, which he thought was free, from a classroom); Ann N. Simmons, Scuffle Exposes 
a Racial Rift; The Altercation Between Three Black Students and a White Security Guard at a Palmdale 
Campus Last Month Has Generated Intense Feelings. A Protest is Planned for Today, L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 
2007, at B1 (reporting on an arrest of a girl after failing to satisfactorily clean up a piece of a birthday 
cake that she had dropped on the f loor); Zach Smith, Report: Martin County Student Arrested for Passing 
Gas, Turning Off Classmate’s Computer, TCpalm, Nov. 21, 2008, available at http://www.tcpalm.com/
news/2008/nov/21/report-martin-county-student-arrested-passing-gas-/ (reporting on a school 
resource officer who arrested a thirteen-year-old boy in Florida for passing gas in school and turning off 
a classmate’s computer and the boy being charged with disruption of a school function); Bill Torpy, Teen 
Punished for Taking Iraq Cell Call; Chat with Army Mom Violated School Policy, Atlanta J.-Const., May 
7, 2005, at 1A (reporting on a student expelled after speaking on a cell phone in school with his mother, 
who was serving in Iraq and whom the child had not spoken to for thirty days).
14. There is no one definition of zero tolerance. The National Center on Education Statistics defines zero 
tolerance broadly to mean policies that mandate a predetermined outcome for particular offenses. Nat’l 
Ctr. for Educ. Stats., supra note 12, at 33. Education researchers often define zero tolerance more 
narrowly as policies that punish both major and minor offenses equally severely. APA Report, supra 
note 6, at 3, n.1.
15. See Zero Tolerance, Zero Evidence, supra note 6, at 7; APA Report, supra note 6, at 852. According 
to Charles Patrick Ewing, a professor of law and psychology at the State University of New York at 
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Moreover, proponents of zero tolerance believe that by removing disruptive students, the 
school climate is improved for all other students.16 Finally, supporters of zero tolerance 
borrow this approach from proponents of broken windows policing, a crime fighting 
philosophy that focuses on responding aggressively to the appearance of minor public 
disorder under the belief that it will prevent or deter more serious criminal offenses.17 
Broken windows proponents, like zero tolerance supporters, believe that minor infractions 
must be dealt with swiftly and forcefully; otherwise, they contend, such infractions will 
signal community disorder and lead to a breakdown of community controls.18
 The two core tactics employed by school districts that implement zero tolerance 
policies are suspensions and arrests. Indeed, the use of each appears to have increased 
significantly since the rise of zero tolerance as a disciplinary and safety tool in public 
schools. Suspensions are now handed down for minor and subjective infractions, 
such as “insubordination,” “disrespect,” and “disobedience.”19 The presence of law 
enforcement personnel20 and the referral of students to the juvenile and criminal 
Buffalo who has written numerous books on violence by juveniles,
[b]eyond immediate safety concerns [the] application of Zero Tolerance appropriately 
denounces violent student behavior in no uncertain terms and serves as a deterrent to 
such behavior in the future by sending a clear message that acts which physically harm 
or endanger others will not be permitted at school under any circumstances . . . . More 
difficult is the application of Zero Tolerance to cases in which violence has been 
threatened but not carried out. Here, as well, both safety and deterrence warrant at least 
a brief suspension from school, with any additional action to be determined later.
 Charles Patrick Ewing, Sensible Zero Tolerance Protects Students, 16 Harv. Educ. Letter 1, 1 (Jan./Feb. 
2000).
16. See APA Report, supra note 6, at 22.
17. Broken windows policing was first introduced in a 1982 Atlantic article. George L. Kelling & James Q. 
Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, Atlantic, Mar. 1982, available at http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/4465/. For additional information 
on the theory and criticisms of broken windows, see infra note 27.
18. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 17.
19. See Civil Rights Project at Harv. Univ. & Advancement Project, Opportunities Suspended: 
The Devastating Consequences of Zero Tolerance and School Discipline Policies 3–7 (2000); 
NYCLU Suspensions Report, supra note 4, at 5; Karega Rausch & Russell Skiba, Unplanned Outcomes: 
Suspensions and Expulsions in Indiana, 2 Educ. Policy Briefs 1, 2 (2004). In 1974, schools in the United 
States issued 1.7 million suspensions. By 2000, that number had increased to 3.1 million suspensions. 
Johanna Wald & Daniel Losen, Defining and Redirecting a School-to-Prison Pipeline, Framing Paper for the 
School-to-Prison Pipeline Research Conference, 9, 10 (May 16–17, 2003), available at http://
justicepolicycenter.org/Articles%20and%20Research/Research/testprisons/SCHOOL_TO_%20
PRISON_%20PIPELINE2003.pdf.
20. Some form of police presence in schools appears to have existed since the 1950s. Kathy Sherling, 
National Association of School Resource Officers: Basic Course Manual (1998); see also 
Cathy Girouard, School Resource Officer Training Program, Fact Sheet (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office 
of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention), Mar. 2001, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
ojjdp/fs200105.pdf. In the late 1990s, the federal government began awarding hundreds of millions of 
dollars to local law enforcement agencies to hire police officers to be stationed in schools. See Ajay 
Khasu et al., Vera Inst. of Justice, Reinforcing Positive Student Behavior to Improve 
School Safety: An Evaluation of Affirm 1 (2003). For example, in 2000 alone, the U.S. Justice 
Department awarded $68 million in grants to hire 599 new police officers to work in schools in 289 
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justice systems for minor infractions have also increased.21 In 2006, the National 
Association of School Resource Officers noted that “school-based policing is ‘the 
fastest growing area of law enforcement.’”22
II. POLICING AND DISCIPLINE IN NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
 New York City has emerged as an innovator in the move to introduce police 
personnel and policing tactics into the schools. Mayor Bloomberg has aggressively 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? ??????????????
move first begun by Mayor Giuliani. In New York City public schools today, 
aggressive policing has proliferated, with the size of the police force patrolling the 
schools having increased by thirty-five percent under Mayor Bloomberg.23 Mayor 
Bloomberg has also increased dramatically New York City’s reliance on suspensions as 
cities and towns. Press Release, Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., Attorney General Janet Reno 
Announces $68 Million in Grants to Hire School Resource Officers: 289 Communities to Receive 599 
SRO’s Nationwide (Sept. 6, 2000), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=524.
21. Research has also shown that a relatively large percentage of such referrals are for non-dangerous, non-
threatening, and even non-criminal offenses. APA Report, supra note 6, at 9, 76–77; see also 
Criminalizing the Classroom Report, supra note 5; see, e.g., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stats., supra 
note 12. Thomas Perez, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in the United States Justice 
Department has recognized this problem and stated that “in schools across the country, we are seeing 
more and more students disrupted on their way to a diploma by increasingly minor infractions.” Thomas 
E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Dep’t of Justice 
of Dep’t of Educ. Conference: Civil Rights and School Discipline: Addressing Disparities to Ensure 
Equal Educational Opportunities (Sept. 27, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/speeches/
perez_eosconf_speech.php; see also Advancement Project, Education on Lockdown: The 
Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track 15 (2005) (examining the rise in the number of arrests in schools in 
numerous jurisdictions, including Denver Public Schools, where from 2000–2004 there was a seventy-
one percent increase in the number of student referrals, most of them for non-violent behavior, to the 
police); Children’s Defense Fund, America’s Cradle to Prison Pipeline 125 (2007) (documenting 
the number of school-based arrests in Miami-Dade County); Peter Finn et al., Comparison of 
Program Activities and Lessons Learned Among 19 School Resource Officer (SRO) 
Programs 7 (2005) (“By 1999 there were at least 12,000 law enforcement officers serving fulltime as 
SROs. . . . Local police departments had about 9,100 full-time SROs assigned to schools. . . . Nationwide, 
about 2,900 sheriffs’ deputies worked as SROs during 1997.”); Simone Robers et al., Nat’l Ctr. for 
Educ. Stats., Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2010 at 80–81 (2010) [hereinafter NCES 
2010 School Safety Report]. A 1997 survey of principals by the U.S. Department of Education found 
that thirty-one percent of high schools used some combination of law enforcement personnel and metal 
detectors. See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stats., supra note 12, at 109. While a 1999 survey found that fifty-
four percent of students reported that police officers or security guards patrolled their schools. See NCES 
2010 School Safety Report, supra, at 81. By 2007, sixty-nine percent of public school students aged 
twelve to eighteen reported the presence of permanent police officers or security guards in their schools, 
and many school districts today house their own police departments.
22. Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 Loy. 
L. Rev. 39, 74 (2006) (citation omitted).
23. In 2002, the year that Mayor Bloomberg took office, 3876 school safety officers patrolled New York 
City schools. City of New York, Mayor’s Management Report: Fiscal 2001????????
Narratives 423 (2001). By 2009, that total had increased by thirty-five percent to 5246 police 
personnel. Proposed Amendment No. 816-A to New York City Charter and Administrative Code of the City of 
New York: Hearing Before the J. Comm. on Educ., Pub. Safety, and Juvenile Justice, N.Y.C. Council 2008–
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a disciplinary tool. The discipline code has changed significantly to include more 
infractions that may result in or even mandate a suspension.24 Not surprisingly, the 
number of students suspended on an annual basis has increased dramatically, from 
31,879 in the 2002–2003 school year to 73,943 in 2008–2009.25 This occurred despite 
a decreasing student population during the same period.26 Yet these practices have not 
taken hold in all schools; they are promulgated primarily in New York City schools 
that are disproportionately attended by children of color from low-income families.
 A.  The NYPD Takes Over School Safety Responsibilities and Grows Dramatically 
with Little Regulation
 In 1998, following years of debate, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani convinced the New 
York City Board of Education (BOE) to transfer school security responsibilities away 
from the BOE to the NYPD. The transfer fit well with Mayor Giuliani’s broken 
windows vision of policing.27 Rudolph Giuliani made “law and order” his signature 
2009 Sess. (Nov. 10, 2009) (testimony of Assistant Chief James Secreto, Commanding Officer, School 
Safety Div., N.Y.C. Police Dep’t) [hereinafter Testimony of Assistant Chief Secreto].
24. NYCLU Suspensions Report, supra note 4, at 11.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Id. at 5.
27. See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 17. This article first introduced the broken windows theory of policing 
and argued that because community members care deeply about public order, the appearance of disorder 
breaks down community controls and leads to community members feeling less committed to their 
neighborhoods, thus allowing for the introduction of criminal elements into the community. Therefore, 
according to the theory, law enforcement agencies should focus on responding aggressively to any public 
offense that may appear disorderly, no matter how minor. Kelling and Wilson recognized that police 
officers responding aggressively to the appearance of public disorder and minor offenses (even those that 
are not illegal) raises Fourth Amendment and racial profiling concerns. They recognized that black and 
Latino residents may be disproportionately targeted by these policies and practices, but ultimately they 
largely ignored these concerns:
The concern about equity is more serious. We might agree that certain behavior makes 
one person more undesirable than another but how do we ensure that age or skin color 
or national origin or harmless mannerisms will not also become the basis for 
distinguishing the undesirable from the desirable? How do we ensure, in short, that the 
police do not become the agents of neighborhood bigotry? We can offer no wholly 
satisfactory answer to this important question. We are not confident that there is a 
satisfactory answer except to hope that by their selection, training, and supervision, the 
police will be inculcated with a clear sense of the outer limit of their discretionary 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
maintain the racial or ethnic purity of a neighborhood.
 Kelling & Wilson, supra note 17, at 8. Broken windows policing has been widely criticized. See Benjamin 
Bowling, The Rise and Fall of New York Murder: Zero Tolerance or Crack’s Decline?, 39 Brit. J. 
Criminology 531 (1999) (attributing the decrease in homicide rates in the 1990s to the decrease of the 
crack cocaine epidemic, which had begun before the implementation of broken windows policing); 
Bernard Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the 
Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 291 (1998) 
(disputing the claim that reducing public disorder deters serious crimes); Bernard Harcourt, Policing 
Disorder: Can We Reduce Serious Crime by Punishing Petty Offenses?, Boston Rev., (April–May 2002) 
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issue as mayor, encouraging NYPD officers to implement broken windows policing 
by responding aggressively to so-called qualify of life offenses.28 William J. Bratton, 
Mayor Giuliani’s first police commissioner, emphasized the importance of responding 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ????????????? ??? ????????? ????? ???????????? ??? ????????? ????? ?????????????
connected to increases in serious crimes rates.29 Similarly, the NYPD taking over 
school safety responsibilities would send a strong signal to children and families that 
the police will respond aggressively to unruliness in school.
 The BOE was very hesitant to approve the transfer of school safety responsibilities 
to the NYPD for fear that it would create a prisonlike environment in certain schools. 
This set the stage for a three-year public battle between the mayor and the Board of 
Education, spanning the tenure of two schools chancellors.30
 In 1998, Mayor Giuliani succeeded in convincing the Board of Education, with 
the support of New York City’s teachers’ union,31 to transfer the BOE’s Division of 
(criticizing the lack of an adequate definition of disorder, suggesting that what proponents of broken 
windows policing might call disorder may be perceived entirely differently by another segment of the 
population, and may actually mean strong community bonds (graffiti is one example), and presenting 
alternative theories for the decline in crime in New York City by providing examples of declining crime 
rates in other cities that did not implement broken windows policing).
28. Interview with Rudolph Giuliani, Mayor of N.Y., in Washington, D.C. (May 3, 2003) [hereinafter 
Giuliani Interview], available at http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/giu0int-1 (“Well, I very 
much subscribe to the ‘Broken Windows’ theory, a theory that was developed by Professors Wilson and 
Kelling, 25 years ago maybe. The idea of it is that you had to pay attention to small things, otherwise 
they would get out of control and become much worse. . . . Aggressive panhandling, the squeegee 
operators that would come up to your car and wash the window of your car whether you wanted it or 
??? ???? ?????????? ???????? ????????? ????? ??? ?????? ??????????????? ????????????? ?????????????? ????
prostitution; the graffiti, all these things that were deteriorating the city.”); see also William J. Bratton, 
The New York City Police Department’s Civil Enforcement of Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J.L. & Pol’y 447 
(1995); Catherine S. Manegold, Giuliani, On Stump, Hits Hard at Crime and How to Fight It, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 13, 1993, at A1.
29. Bratton, supra note 28, at 447–49; see also Giuliani Interview, supra note 28. 
30. See Edward N. Costikyan et al., Report of the Mayor’s Investigatory Commission on School 
Safety (1996) (recommending that the NYPD play a greater role in ensuring safety in the schools); 
David Firestone, Mayor’s Critics Assail School Safety Inquiry, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1995, at B3, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/13/nyregion/mayor-s-critics-assail-school-safety-inquiry.html 
(describing a commission appointed by the mayor, without informing the schools chancellor, to study 
the issue of school safety and make recommendations for improvements); Maria Newman, Giuliani 
Chides Cortines for Resisting Use of Police, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1995, at B3, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/1995/06/01/nyregion/giuliani-chides-cortines-for-resisting-use-of-police.html 
(describing how in June 1995, Mayor Giuliani began publicly rebuking Schools Chancellor Ramon C. 
Cortines for his objections to the transfer of school safety responsibilities to the NYPD); Vivian S. Toy, 
Police Takeover of School Safety Is Urged, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1995, (Sunday) at 29, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/1995/12/31/nyregion/police-takeover-of-school-safety-is-urged.html (describing 
criticism by opponents of the NYPD taking over school safety matters for not seeking out their 
opinions).
31. See Timothy Williams, Board of Ed Approves NYPD School Safety Plan, Associated Press, Sept. 17, 
1998 (“The few who spoke in favor of the proposal were shouted down or booed by the crowd. ‘It does 
not seek the initial increase in the number of armed police in schools or the number of schools with 
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School Safety to the NYPD, including the authority to recruit, hire, train, and 
supervise school safety personnel.32 The vote, which took place on September 16, 
1998, did not take place without controversy.33 Parents, teachers, and community 
members packed the hearing room to criticize the proposed transfer; more than one 
hundred people had to wait outside the crowded room.34 Inside, parents and advocates 
expressed worry that having the NYPD take over school safety would create a 
“prisonlike atmosphere in the schools.”35 Leaders from the black community 
expressed concerns about increasing interactions between black children and a police 
force that does not understand them; they also expressed concerns that police 
personnel in the schools would undermine the authority of school officials.36 Others 
criticized the impact that police personnel in the schools would have on the learning 
environment in the nation’s largest school district.37 The New York Civil Liberties 
Union expressed concern that having the NYPD take over school safety would 
undermine the constitutional rights of students.38
 Despite these concerns, the BOE voted unanimously to transfer school safety 
responsibilities to the NYPD and, according to news accounts, the vote occurred 
because of two promises made by Mayor Giuliani to the BOE and Schools Chancellor 
Rudy Crew, who for years opposed transferring school safety responsibilities to the 
NYPD.39 First, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani promised that the number of police 
personnel in the schools would not increase;40 at the time, there were between 3041 
armed officers, nor does it seek to arm school safety officers,’ said Jim Baumann, director of school 
safety for the United Federation of Teachers. ‘It does not seek to turn schools into armed camps.’”).
32. Memorandum of Understanding Among the Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C., the Chancellor of the City School 
District of N.Y.C., and N.Y.C. on the Performance of School Security Functions by the N.Y.C. Police 
Department for the Benefit of the City Sch. Dist. of N.Y.C. and its Students and Staff, signed by Bd. of 
Educ. President William C. Thompson, Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, and Chancellor Rudy Crew (Sept. 
17, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter MOU]; Lynette Holloway, Board Votes to Give Police Control 
Over School Security Board Votes to Give Police Control Over School Security , N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1998, at 
B5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/17/nyregion/board-votes-to-give-police-control-over-
school-security.html; Williams, supra note 31.
33. See Holloway, supra note 32; Williams, supra note 31. 
34. Holloway, supra note 32; Williams, supra note 31.
35. Holloway, supra note 32.
36. Id. Rev. Adolph Roberts of Mount Calvary Baptist Church in Harlem expressed worry about compromising 
the dignity of school children by sending them to a school environment reminiscent of a police state. 
Timothy Williams, NYC Turns School Security Over to Police, Associated Press, Sept. 17, 1998.
37. Holloway, supra note 32.
38. Williams, supra note 31.
39. See Holloway, supra note 32 (“Now, after years of behind-the-scenes work, the current Chancellor, Rudy 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
have hammered out a compromise plan in which the Police Department is in charge but does not 
increase its personnel in the schools.”).
40. Id.
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and 3200 school safety personnel.41 Second, NYPD Commissioner Howard Safir 
promised that school safety officers would not arrest students or school staff.42
 The day after the vote took place that approved the transfer, the Board of 
Education released data that showed that serious crime had declined in the schools.43 
According to the report, which in past years had been released in August, violent and 
serious crimes accounted for just seven percent of all school incidents.44 Opponents 
of the transfer criticized the city for releasing this vital information the day after the 
vote had taken place and argued that the data proved that there was not an emergency 
situation in the schools that demanded the intervention of the NYPD.45
  1. Current State of Policing in New York City Schools
 Since the transfer of school safety responsibilities from the Board of Education to 
the NYPD, the number of police personnel in the schools has increased from sixty-
four to seventy-three percent, from 3041 to 3200 in 1998,46 to 5439 today (not 
including the 190 armed police officers assigned to the schools).47 Most of the 
increase has occurred under Mayor Bloomberg. In 2002, the year that Mayor 
Bloomberg took office, 3876 school safety officers patrolled New York City schools.48 
By 2009, that total had increased by thirty-five percent to 5249 school safety officers. 
This dramatic increase in the number of police personnel occurred despite a decrease 
in the student population by approximately 70,000 students during that same 
period,49 and even though serious school crime was declining prior to the 1998 
transfer.50 The increase also occurred despite the promises made by Mayor Giuliani 
41. News reports in 1998 stated that there were 3200 school safety officers at the time. Id.; Susan Edelman, 
Tempers Flare Over Timing of School-Crime Report Card, N.Y. Post, Sept. 18, 1998, http://www.nypost.
com/p/news/tempers_f lare_over_timing_of_school_Y0N1xEPqzuzDa1OMiovshN. In 2009, the 
commanding officer of the NYPD’s School Safety Division testified before the New York City Council 
that at the time of the transfer of school safety responsibilities to the NYPD in 1998, there were 3041 
school safety officers on staff. Testimony of Assistant Chief Secreto, supra note 23.
42. Williams, supra note 31 (“Safety officers now carry only handcuffs, not guns, and do not have the power 
to arrest anyone, and Safir said that will not change.”).
43. Edelman, supra note 41, at 6. 
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See supra note 41 for an explanation of the range of estimates.
47. Testimony of Assistant Chief Secreto, supra note 23 (testifying that in 2009, there were 5249 school 
safety officers in New York City’s public schools). The School Safety Division has not faced budget cuts 
since 2009, so the number of school safety officers is approximately the same.
48. City of New York, Mayor’s Management Report: Fiscal 2001?????????????????? 432 (2001).
49. In 2002, there were 1,098,832 students enrolled in New York City public schools. City of New York, 
Mayor’s Management Report: Fiscal 2002 at 15 (2002). By 2009, there were 1,029,500 students 
enrolled. City of New York, Mayor’s Management Report: Fiscal 2009 at 16 (2009).
50. Edelman, supra note 41.
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not to increase the size of the police force in the schools.51 Today, every high school 
in New York City has approximately ten to twenty school safety officers, and middle 
and elementary schools have between one and five school safety officers each.52
 As peace officers, school safety officers wear NYPD uniforms and have the 
authority to stop, frisk, question, detain, search, and arrest students.53 School safety 
officers do not carry firearms, yet the NYPD’s School Safety Division has at least 
190 armed police officers who are assigned to patrol New York City public schools.54 
School safety officers receive fourteen weeks of police academy training,55 compared 
to six months for police officers.56
 Today, the NYPD school safety division, as noted above, represents the fifth 
largest police force in the nation, and New York City schools have more police 
personnel per student than other cities have police officers per civilians. San Antonio, 
which has a population slightly greater than the population in New York City 
schools,57 employs less than half as many police officers.58 The city of Houston, 
which has a population of 2.1 million people,59 approximately twice the population 
of students in New York City schools, has 5400 police officers.60 Moreover, New 
York City hires more school safety officers than employees to positions that have 
historically addressed student misbehavior; for example, although New York City has 
more than 5400 police personnel patrolling public schools, it employs almost 3000 
guidance counselors and nearly 1500 social workers.61
51. See Holloway, supra note 32.
52. Khasu et al., supra note 20, at 3.
53. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 2.20 (McKinney 2011).
54. Amended Complaint at 2, B.H. v. Bloomberg, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143103 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 
2010) (No. 10-0210) [hereinafter B.H. Amended Complaint].
55. Testimony of Assistant Chief Secreto, supra note 41.
56. NYPD Officers Graduate from Police Academy, NBC New York (Dec. 22, 2011, 9:18 PM), http://www.
nbcnewyork.com/news/local/NYPD-Graduation-2011-Madison-Square-Garden-Ceremony-136096523.
html.
57. Quick Facts, San Antonio (city), Texas, U.S. Census Bureau (last revised Jan. 31, 2012), http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/48/4865000.html; Mayor’s Management Report: Fiscal 2009, supra note 49, 
at 16.
58. See supra note 47; Police—Employment Opportunities, City of San Antonio, http://www.sanantonio.
gov/sapd/employment.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
59. Houston Facts and Figures, City of Houston TX, http://www.houstontx.gov/abouthouston/houstonfacts.
html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
60. James Pinkerton, New HPD Chief McClelland no stranger to obstacles, Hous. Chron., Apr. 14, 2010, at A1.
61. The author of this article has had numerous conversations with officials at the United Federation of 
Teachers (UFT) about the number of guidance counselors and social workers in New York City schools. 
According to the UFT, there are 2929 guidance counselors and 1473 social workers in New York City 
public schools as of June 30, 2011. Copies of email correspondence are on file with the author.
1385
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 56 | 2011/12
 Mayor Bloomberg has also introduced additional aggressive policing tactics into 
the schools. In January 2004, he unveiled the Impact Schools Initiative, which 
introduced heavy-handed policing tactics into select schools with higher than average 
rates of reported crimes and suspensions and below average rates of attendance.62 These 
schools also have a higher percentage of black students and lower levels of spending per 
student.63 Under the initiative, the number of police officers assigned to the school is 
doubled and the removal of a misbehaving student to an alternative school is expedited.64 
A taskforce of one hundred and fifty armed police officers is exclusively dedicated to 
policing schools on the impact list, which range in number every year.65
 Moreover, on April 13, 2006, Mayor Bloomberg announced yet another school 
policing program, this time subjecting all middle and high school students to roving 
metal detector searches.66 The deployment of the metal detectors is unannounced and 
meant to catch students by surprise. Students are made to enter the school by passing 
through the metal detectors and submitting to bag scanners similar to those used at 
airports.67 The program has been plagued with problems, causing chaos at schools and 
leading students to miss class time as they wait to pass through a massive police presence 
that includes dozens of police vehicles and approximately sixty police personnel.68
 For example, on October 24, 2006, more than two dozen police vehicles surrounded 
Aviation High School in Queens and installed metal detectors.69 Long lines began to 
gather outside the school as police officers made every student submit to a metal 
detector and bag search.70 Police officers confiscated engineering tools that students 
brought for class (Aviation High School is certified by the federal government to train 
aviation mechanics), with one officer describing the tools as “hazardous to society.”71 
They also confiscated the camera of Aviation’s yearbook photographer, water bottles, 
62. Sharon Balmer, Nat’l Ctr. for Schs. & Cmtys. at Fordham Univ., Policing as Education 
Policy: A Briefing on the Initial Impact of the Impact Schools Program 4 (2006).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Press Release, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, Schools Chancellor Joel I. Klein and 
Police Commissioner Raymond R. Kelly Announce Implementation of School Safety Plan (Jan. 5, 2004) 
[hereinafter Press Release, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.], http://schools.nyc.gov/Offices/mediarelations/
NewsandSpeeches/2003-2004/1-5-2004-11-45-37-901.htm.
66. Press Release, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, Schools Chancellor Joel I. Klein and 
Police Commissioner Raymond R. Kelly Announce A New School Safety Initiative Amid Significant 
Declines in Crime in City Impact Schools (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Press Release, New School Safety 
Initiative], http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.
jsp?pageID=mayor_press_release&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%
2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2006a%2Fpr114-06.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1.
67. Criminalizing the Classroom Report, supra note 5, at 9. 
68. Id.
69. Id. at 11.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????72 Cell phones, 
which are prohibited in New York City public schools, were also seized; the principal 
told parents that 617 electronic devices were confiscated on that day.73 The surprise 
visit caused so much disruption that classes were cancelled in the early part of the day 
because hundreds of students were still waiting in line when first period began at 8:00 
a.m.74 Students reported that after the roving metal detectors came to their schools, 
they lost trust in their school administrators and in the NYPD.75
 There is some quantitative data available to the public about criminal and non-
criminal incidents as well as police practices in the schools. While the number of 
incidents in the schools has been on a decline (serious incidents were on a decline  prior 
to the transfer of school safety to the NYPD), the vast majority of reported incidents in 
schools are for minor or non-criminal offenses.76 Moreover, while for many years the 
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The typical attendance rate at Aviation High School is around ninety-three percent, yet on that day 
the attendance rate dropped to seventy percent. Id.
75. Id.
76. The mayor’s office releases data on an annual basis on school safety matters as part of the Mayor’s 
Management Report, which is required by the City Charter. However, the manner in which the data is 
released raises serious concerns about manipulation. In fiscal year 1999, the first year that the NYPD 
???? ??? ?????????? ??????? ???????? ???????????????? ???????? ????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
6162 “other criminal and non-criminal incidents,” which the report defined as the number of all other 
assaults, misdemeanors, and other “serious non-criminal” incidents reported in schools. Mayor’s 
Management Report: Fiscal 2002, supra note 49, at 20; City of New York, Mayor’s Management 
Report: Fiscal 2002 Supplementary Indicator Tables 18 (2002). By fiscal year 2002, the first 
year that Mayor Bloomberg was mayor, those numbers had increased to 4545 serious criminal incidents 
and 10,057 other criminal and non-criminal incidents. Mayor’s Management Report: Fiscal 2002, 
supra note 49, at 20. The report attributed some of the increase to better reporting methods. A 
companion to the Mayor’s Management Report offered a breakdown of these numbers, revealing that 
the vast majority of serious criminal incidents (eighty-six percent) were for assault (thirty-three percent) 
and weapons possession (fifty-three percent). Mayor’s Management Report: Fiscal 2002 supra, at 
70–71. These two categories may be misapplied to incidents that may not seem as severe. For example, 
in 2006, when the NYPD seized 170 weapons through the roving metal detectors initiative, 115 were 
knives, box cutters, and razors and fifty-eight were pipes and scissors. No guns were found. Beth Fertig, 
Majority of Confiscations in Schools Aren’t Weapons, WNYC (Jan. 12, 2007), http://www.wnyc.org/
articles/wnyc-news/2007/jan/12/majority-of-confiscations-in-schools-arent-weapons/. Similarly, the 
“other criminal and non-criminal category” revealed that the significant majority of the incidents 
(eighty-six percent) were for harassment (forty-six percent), disorderly conduct (fourteen percent), and 
petit larceny (eight percent). Mayor’s Management Report: Fiscal 2002 supra, at 70–71. Mayor 
Bloomberg stopped releasing detailed information on criminal and non-criminal school incidents in 
fiscal year 2007. (The move was later criticized by advocates, but nonetheless has not changed. Jo 
Craven McGinty, Statistically Speaking, at Least, the City Is a Quieter Place These Days, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
9, 2009, at A33.) That year, the NYPD reported 1164 serious crimes. City of New York, Mayor’s 
Management Report: Fiscal 2007 at 20 (2007). However, this time the report no longer counted 
weapons possession and sex offenses but the seven major index crimes (murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, felonious assault, burglary, grand larceny and grand larceny auto). 
City of New York, Mayor’s Management Report: Fiscal 2007 Indicator Definitions 22 
(2007). Grand larceny made up fifty percent of the incidents, and felony assault twenty-one percent. 
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NYPD and the New York City Department of Education (DOE) would not release 
data on the number of arrests and summonses in New York City schools, advocates 
fought for passage of the Student Safety Act through the City Council, which since its 
passage in 2011 has begun to provide some basic information on arrests and summonses 
in schools, although at the time of the writing of this article, the data was insufficient 
to draw conclusions.77 The new law mandates reporting by the NYPD on the number 
and type of arrests and summonses made by the School Safety Division, and reporting 
by the DOE on suspensions in New York City schools, with both sets of data 
disaggregated by student demographic information.78
 As a result of the NYPD’s dramatic and, as will be discussed later, poorly 
regulated growth in New York City schools, children today, and primarily children 
of color from low-income families, are handcuffed and arrested for misbehavior that 
traditionally would not have been handled by police personnel or by the juvenile and 
criminal justice systems.79 Indeed, the NYPD receives hundreds of complaints a year 
against school safety officers, even though the complaint process for a long period of 
time had been obscured, and the normal complaint process against abusive police 
officers does not apply to school safety officers.80
City of New York, Mayor’s Management Report: Fiscal 2007 Supplementary Indicator 
Tables 90 (2007). When comparing this data to the 2002 figure, and counting the missing categories 
and the newly-created category of “possession of dangerous instrument,” there were 2407 “serious 
criminal incidents,” as defined in 2002, significantly fewer than in 2002 but 107% higher than had been 
reported in 2007. Mayor’s Management Report: Fiscal 2007, supra, at 20.
77. Local Law No. 6, N.Y.C. (2011) (codified as amended at N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-1101–1103 (2011)) 
(“To amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to reports on school discipline 
and police department activity relating to schools.”) The author of this report drafted the first version of 
the Student Safety Act, Intro. 816A-2008, which originally included a provision that would have 
expanded the jurisdiction of the Civilian Complaint Review Board to receive complaints of misconduct 
against school safety officers. The final version of the Act, Intro. 442-2010, did not include such a 
provision.
78. Id. The reporting on arrests and summonses will not provide a full picture of all arrests and summonses 
in schools, as the reporting will include only arrests and summonses made by the NYPD’s School Safety 
Division, which excludes arrests in schools made by precinct-based police officers who are not part of 
the School Safety Division.
79. See infra notes 100–06 for numerous examples.
80. See Letter from Raymond W. Kelly, N.Y.C. Police Comm’r, to Hon. Robert Jackson, Chairman of Educ. 
Comm., N.Y.C. Council (June 11, 2007) (on file with author) (explaining that the Civilian Complaint 
Review Board does not accept complaints against school safety officers, and that such complaints are 
investigated by the NYPD’s Internal Affairs Division); see also Letter from Police Comm’r Raymond W. 
Kelly, to the Hon. Christine C. Quinn, Speaker of the N.Y.C. Council (undated) (on file with the author) 
(explaining that all complaints against school safety agents are initially directed to the NYPD’s Internal 
Affairs Bureau, which may then direct some complaints to other internal investigative units). But see 
Letter from Dep’t of Educ., to Council Member Robert Jackson (Mar. 1, 2007) (on file with author) 
(stating that complaints against school safety officers must be filed with the CCRB. “With regard to 
SSA’s accountability, they can be reported to Civilian Complaint Review Boards.”). This is an example of 
the DOE being so removed from its responsibility over school safety matters that it does not even 
understand the process to hold school safety officers accountable for their actions.
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 Examples of complaints of police misconduct in the schools are not hard to find. 
On April 13, 2011, school safety officers handcuffed seven-year-old Joseph Anderson, 
a black student from Queens, after he threw a temper tantrum when he did not like his 
Easter egg decoration.81 School safety officers took the first grader, in handcuffs, to a 
local hospital for mental evaluation, despite the fact that his mother told school officials 
that she was on her way to pick up her son.82 Joseph, who has attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder and delayed speech, was clearly traumatized by the incident.83 
The DOE and NYPD defended the handcuffing, claiming officers used it to protect 
Joseph and his classmates.84
 On March 10, 2009, a school safety officer arrested twelve-year-old M.M. at her 
Hunts Point School for drawing on a desk.85 M.M. and a classmate drew lines with 
erasable makers on each other’s desks.86 A teacher told them to erase the marks, but 
before they could do so, school safety officers arrived and escorted M.M. and the 
other student to a security room,87 where an armed police officer accused M.M. of 
graffiti.88 A school safety officer then escorted M.M. back to the classroom for her to 
retrieve her book bag and handcuffed M.M. in the hallway in front of her classmates 
and school staff.89 M.M. was then taken to the security office where she was made to 
remove her shoes and sweater and submit to a pat-down search.90 M.M., who was 
crying, asked to speak with her mother but was not allowed to do so.91 M.M. and her 
classmate were then taken in handcuffs to the local precinct,92 fingerprinted, 
photographed,93 and given a summons for family court.94 When M.M.’s mother 
81. Meredith Kolodner, Special-Ed Student Joseph Anderson, 7, Handcuffed by Cops at Queens School After 
Easter Egg Tantrum, N.Y. Daily News, Apr. 21, 2011, at 5, available at http://articles.nydailynews.
com/2011-04-21/local/29473024_1_easter-egg-queens-school-maspeth-school; Camille Mann, Easter 
Egg Tantrum Leads to Handcuffs for NYC 7-Year-Old, CBS News (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.
com/8301-504083_162-20056185-504083.html; Jeff Pegues, NYPD Handcuffs 7-Year-Old Special Ed 
Student, WABC News (Apr. 21, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/local/new_
york&id=8087177.
82. Kolodner, supra note 81; Mann, supra note 81.
83. In the days following the incident, he screamed when he heard an ambulance, sometimes wet himself, 
and had problems falling asleep and eating. According to his mother, “I don’t let him watch the news 
anymore, because if he sees cops, he cries.” Kolodner, supra note 81; Pegues, supra note 81.
84. Pegues, supra note 81.
85. B.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 54, at 15.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 16.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 17.
94. Id.
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attempted to file a complaint with the principal about the mistreatment of her 
daughter, she was told that there was nothing that the principal could do because this 
was a police matter.95
 In another example, in January 2008, five-year-old Dennis Rivera was handcuffed 
for throwing a temper tantrum in his Queens kindergarten class.96 Dennis suffers 
from speech problems, asthma, and attention deficit disorder.97 When Dennis 
knocked some items off of the principal’s desk, a school safety officer handcuffed 
Dennis’s hands behind his back and took Dennis to a hospital for a psychiatric 
evaluation, without his parent’s permission.98 When asked for comment about the 
incident, school officials explained that Dennis had punched an administrator the 
day before.99 Gregory Floyd, who is the president of the labor union that represents 
school safety officers, said, “The reality is something had to be done. . . . I’m saying 
this 5-year-old, not every 5-year-old, this 5-year-old could not be controlled.”100 
Dennis was so traumatized by the incident that his mother withdrew him from 
school because he was afraid to go back.101
 On March 30, 2007, school safety officers handcuffed and arrested thirteen-year-
old Chelsea Fraser in front of her classmates at her Dyker Heights school in Brooklyn.102 
Two days before the arrest, some of her classmates acted out in class by plastering the 
walls with stickers.103 Chelsea, who was president of her class and captain of the school’s 
volleyball team, did not participate, but sat at her desk and wrote on it the word 
“okay.”104 Two days later, Chelsea was handcuffed and taken out of school in a police 
van while her classmates watched and her teacher cried.105 She was then handcuffed to 
95. Id. 
96. Carrie Melago, 5-year-old boy Handcuffed in School, Taken to Hospital for Misbehaving, N.Y. Daily News, 
Jan. 25, 2008, at 5, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/5-year-old-boy-handcuffed-school-
hospital-misbehaving-article-1.341677.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Child Handcuffed, Television Broadcast, CBS New York (Jan. 26, 2008), available at http://www.
liveleak.com/view?i=e84_1201369113.
101. See Melago, supra note 96; see also Child Handcuffed, supra note 100; Carrie Melago, Cuffed Kid’s Life on 
Hold Since Clash: Shackled over a Tantrum in January, Qns. Boy Has No Word on New School, N.Y. Daily 
News, Apr. 21, 2008, at 12 (detailing how Dennis had to wait months before he could resume his 
schooling at a different public school).
102. Jenn Chung, 13-Year-Old Arrested for Defacing School Desk, Gothamist (Apr. 6, 2007, 4:26 PM), http://
gothamist.com/2007/04/06/13yearold_arres.php; Principal ’s Arrest Highlights Power Struggle in Schools, 
WABC News (Oct. 10, 2007), http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/local&id=5700943; 
Errol Louis, Op-Ed., End the War on Our Schoolkids, N.Y. Daily News, Oct. 14, 2007, at 35.
103. David Goodman, Hard Time Out, Mother Jones Mag., July–Aug. 2008, available at http://
motherjones.com/politics/2008/07/hard-time-out.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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a pole over her head while being interrogated for three hours at the precinct.106 Her 
mother, who immediately came to the police precinct when she learned of her daughter’s 
arrest, was not allowed in the room while her daughter was being interrogated.107 
Chelsea was charged with criminal mischief and making graffiti.108
 Principals and teachers are not immune from aggressive policing in the schools, 
and their arrests have highlighted the tension that exists between education staff and 
NYPD personnel in the schools. In 2007, Mark Federman, the popular and highly 
respected principal of East Side Community High School in Manhattan, was 
arrested for pleading with the police not to escort a handcuffed honor roll student 
out of the school’s front door in front of her classmates.109 The student, seventeen-
year-old Isamar Gonzalez, was trying to enter the school early to catch up on 
coursework when she was stopped by school safety officers.110 Ms. Gonzalez refused 
the school safety officer’s request to stay out of school and the confrontation escalated. 
The NYPD accused her of punching the school safety officer, but she claimed that 
the school safety officer pulled her hair. This resulted in school safety officers 
handcuffing Ms. Gonzalez and placing her under arrest.111 Mark Federman asked 
the school safety officers not to parade Ms. Gonzalez in front of the hundreds of 
gathering students outside of the school and instead to remove Ms. Gonzalez through 
the back entrance to avoid embarrassment.112 He stood in front of the front door 
entrance while pleading with the school safety officers.113 School safety officers 
?????????? ??? ???????????? ???? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ???? ????????? ?????????
???????? ??? ???? ????????????????????????? ??? ????????? ???????? ??? ???? ???????114 The 
principal was charged with obstructing government activity and resisting arrest.115
 The DOE and NYPD defended both arrests, stating that the student attempted 
to hit a school safety officer and that the principal attempted to block the arrest.116 
Yet the DOE also stated that no disciplinary action would be taken against the 
106. Id.
107. Child Handcuffed, supra note 100.
108. Id.
109. Jennifer Medina, Police Arrest a Student, Then Her Principal, Too, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 2007, at B3; 
Principal ’s Arrest Highlights Power Struggle in Schools, supra note 102.
110. Medina, supra note 109.
111. Id.; Irene J. Liu et al., Pushy Principal Gets Busted at His School; Blocked ‘Humiliating’ Student Arrest: Cops, 
N.Y. Post, Oct. 10, 2007, at 8.
112. People v. Federman, 852 N.Y.S.2d 748, 750–51 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2008) (noting that Principal Federman 
had been praised as a visionary leader in a 2007 review by the Department of Education); see Medina, 
supra note 109; Principal ’s Arrest Highlights Power Struggle in Schools, supra note 102.
113. Federman, 852 N.Y.S.2d at 750; Principal ’s Arrest Highlights Power Struggle in Schools, supra note 102.
114. See Medina, supra note 109; Louis, supra note 102 (noting that this incident demonstrated that the 
police, and not principals, are running school safety and discipline).
115. Federman, 852 N.Y.S.2d at 748–49.
116. See Medina, supra note 109.
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principal.117 The president of the principal’s union, Ernest Logan, criticized the 
arrest, stating, “Our major concern has always been that we are criminalizing the 
behavior in schools. The question has always been if this usurps the power of the 
principal, who is supposed to be in charge of the building.”118 But the school safety 
union responded by stating that “they are the ones being treated like criminals. . . . 
They are the ones being assaulted and degraded.”119 These arrests occurred the day 
before a scheduled City Council oversight hearing on the issue of police in schools, 
including whether there was an adequate school safety governance structure in place 
in the city’s schools.120
 On February 26, 2008, Criminal Court Judge Tanya R. Kennedy dismissed the 
criminal case against Mark Federman.121 Judge Kennedy recognized that a court’s 
power to dismiss a case in the interest of justice should only be exercised in that “rare 
and unusual case where it cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of 
conventional consideration.”122 She concluded that the principal did not threaten the 
safety of the school safety officer or the school and that the “present case is precisely 
that rare circumstance where fundamental justice will only occur upon dismissal.”123 
Judge Kennedy noted that this incident raised serious questions about the governance 
structure over school safety matters in New York City and that continuing the 
prosecution against Mark Federman would serve no useful purposes.124
 Aggressive policing appears to be most prevalent in high schools with permanent 
metal detectors, the number of which appear to have grown significantly under the 
Bloomberg administration. In April 2006, the city reported that twenty-one percent 
of middle and high schools had permanent metal detectors.125 In the same report, the 
city stated that in 2005 there were seventy-nine schools with permanent metal 
detectors, while in 2006 that number increased to eighty-two.126 Investigations by 
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Jennifer Medina, Safety Agents Are Defended After 2 Arrests at City School, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 2007, at 
B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/11/nyregion/11council.html; Principal ’s Arrest 
Highlights Power Struggle in Schools, supra note 102.
120. Medina, supra note 109. The author of this article worked closely with lawmakers and other advocates to 
schedule and prepare for this hearing. The arrests of Mr. Federman and Ms. Gonzalez resonated 
throughout the hearing as examples of the problem of aggressive policing in the schools and the problems 
that are caused by the lack of an adequate governance structure over school safety and discipline.
121. People v. Federman, 852 N.Y.S.2d 748, 750 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2008).
122. Id. at 749 (quoting People v. Khan, 841 N.Y.S.2d 221, 221 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2007)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
123. Id. at 750.
124. Id. at 751. For an example of NYPD officers arresting teachers, see First Amended Complaint, Kronen v. 
City of New York, No. 06 Civ. 1705, 2006 WL 2843223 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2006). For a discussion of 
why the NYCLU filed the complaint, see Kronen v. NYC (Challenging arrest of high school teachers who 
questioned handcuffing of students), NYCLU, http://www.nyclu.org/node/1099 (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
125. Press Release, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 65.
126. Id.
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the NYCLU since 2006 have revealed that the number of schools with permanent 
metal detectors has increased to at least 140, with more than 100,000 students 
attending such schools.127
 In schools with permanent metal detectors, which are disproportionately attended 
by black and Latino children from low-income families,128 there is a more intense 
police presence, both in the number of police personnel assigned to the schools and 
in the frequency of police-student interactions. The metal detectors are operated by 
school safety officers, who also administer the bag scans as well as follow-up frisks 
and more intrusive searches if necessary.129 In these schools, simple daily interactions 
can result in misunderstandings and power struggles. A student who does not want 
to give up his or her cellphone when identified by the metal detector scan, knowing 
full well that schools without metal detectors rarely enforce the ban on cellphones, 
will be confronted with police personnel who have little patience for misbehaving 
students and who have the authority and willingness to arrest children who resist or 
act in an aggressive manner. All too often, these interactions act as f lashpoints of 
confrontation that lead to greater problems.
 According to NYPD data from 2005, children at schools with permanent metal 
detectors are more often confronted by police personnel for “non-criminal” incidents 
than their peers citywide. In schools with permanent metal detectors, seventy-seven 
percent of police personnel interventions are in non-criminal incidents.130 This 
percentage is twice as high as those in similarly-sized schools without metal detectors.131
 In a 2007 survey conducted by the NYCLU of 1000 students who attend schools 
with permanent metal detectors, a significant percentage of students complained of 
misconduct by school safety officers.132 Fifty-three percent of students surveyed 
reported that police personnel spoke to them in ways that made them feel 
uncomfortable, including cursing and screaming at students, and even referring to 
students as “baby Rikers.”133 Educators expressed concern that school safety officers 
acted too aggressively toward students, even assaulting them.134 One school aide 
127. The N.Y.C Department of Education seldom releases data on the number of schools with metal 
detectors, despite repeated requests by the NYCLU for such data. Thus, the NYCLU, every couple of 
years, has assigned staff and interns to call schools to find out whether they have metal detectors. A list 
of schools with metal detectors is on file with the author.
128. According to an NYCLU and ACLU analysis of the 2004–2005 school year, eighty-two percent of 
students who attended schools with permanent metal detectors were black or Latino, compared to a 
citywide average of seventy-one percent. Students from low-income families constituted fifty-nine 
percent of children attending high schools that had permanent metal detectors, compared to a citywide 
average of fifty-one percent. Criminalizing the Classroom Report, supra note 5, at 20.
129. See N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ. Reg. of the Chancellor, A-432, Search & Seizure, (2005).
130. Criminalizing the Classroom Report, supra note 5, at 20.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 16
133. Id.
134. Id.
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reported seeing a school safety officer hitting a student in the jaw for not handing 
over his cell phone, then handcuffing and removing the student from the school.135 
Students also complained of intrusive searches, with fifty-eight percent reporting 
that they have had to take off or lift up clothes to enter school, and fifty-three percent 
reporting that police personnel had frisked them and searched their pockets at the 
metal detectors.136 Twenty-seven percent reported that police personnel touched 
them in a way that made them feel uncomfortable.137 Girls whose under-wire bras set 
off the metal detectors reported having to lift up their shirts before school safety 
officers.138 An openly-gay student at one high school said that school safety officers 
discriminated against him, and that “[w]hen it’s time for me to get scanned, the male 
security guards f lip a coin to see who has to scan me.”139 Eighty-two percent of 
students reported that they have been late to class because of the metal detectors.140
 In 2010, the New York Civil Liberties Union, along with the American Civil 
Liberties Union and the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney LLP, filed a federal class 
action lawsuit challenging the NYPD’s policies and practices of seizing and arresting 
school children in violation of the Fourth Amendment.141 The lawsuit, filed on 
behalf of six school children and one organization, claims that NYPD personnel 
handcuff and arrest students for minor violations of school rules, absent probable 
cause of criminal activity, and use excessive force against students, which too often 
results in the child’s physical injury and, in some cases, hospitalization.142 The 
complaint documents more than two dozen stories of students who were engaged in 
non-criminal conduct and were handcuffed, arrested, or physically assaulted by 
police personnel at school.143 The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, 
asking that New York City develop a meaningful mechanism to file complaints 
against school safety officers; develop guidelines to ensure that children are not 
wrongfully arrested; improve the disciplinary process over school safety officers who 
have been found to engage in wrongdoing; ensure that school administrators have a 
role in maintaining school safety; and implement better training for school safety 
officers.144
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 16–17.
139. Id. at 16.
140. Id. at 17.
141. B.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 54. The author of this article is co-counsel on the case.
142. Id. at 33–34, 62–63.
143. Id. at 15–31, 38–53.
144. Id. at 65–66.
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  2.  No Adequate Governance Structure Regulating Police Activities in Schools
 The relationship between the NYPD and the DOE in matters of school safety is 
defined in a 1998 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), a legal agreement that 
was renewed in 2003 without public debate and even without the knowledge of top 
officials within the NYPD and the DOE.145 For six years, high-ranking officials in 
both the NYPD and DOE repeatedly stated that the MOU had expired.146 It was 
only during the 2009 debate in the New York State Legislature on reauthorization of 
mayoral control of schools that Brooklyn Assembly Member Karim Camara learned 
that Mayor Bloomberg had reauthorized the Memorandum of Understanding.147
 The Memorandum of Understanding and subsequent police documents and 
comments raise serious concerns about the lack of an adequate governance structure 
to regulate police activities in schools, and about the authority given to police 
personnel to enforce non-criminal disciplinary matters in schools. The 1998 
145. The 1998 MOU was only supposed to stay in effect for four years and during that period a “Joint 
Committee” on school safety was required to complete annual evaluations of school safety and the NYPD’s 
handling of it. MOU, supra note 32, at 1–3. After three years of evaluations, the mayor or the Board of 
Education would have had the authority to terminate the transfer, effective on the fourth anniversary. Id. 
at 13. At a meeting that the author of this article had on May 4, 2007 with NYPD Chief Douglas Ziegler 
and Assistant Chief James Secreto, who at that time were in charge of the NYPD’s School Safety division, 
they explained that with the advent of mayoral control of city schools, no new MOU was necessary to 
replace the expired MOU. Letter from NYCLU to Michael Bloomberg, N.Y.C. Mayor, Joel Klein, 
Chancellor of N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., & Raymond Kelly, N.Y.C. Police Comm’r (June 16, 2009) (on file 
with author). Similarly, on October 10, 2007, Deputy Chancellor Kathleen Grimm testified at a City 
Council hearing that “[t]o the best of my knowledge there was no joint committee that met and 
recommended a renewal of that MOU . . . there is no written MOU.” Joint Hearing on School Safety Before 
the Comm. on Educ., Comm. on Public Safety, & Comm. on Juvenile Justice, 2006–2009 Sess. N.Y.C. City 
Council 66–68 (Oct. 10, 2007) (testimony of Kathleen Grimm, Deputy Chancellor on Admin. & Fin.) 
[hereinafter Testimony of Deputy Chancellor Grimm]. The City Council’s chair of the Public Safety 
Committee, Peter Vallone, Jr., relied on this testimony and other representations made by the NYPD and 
DOE when he issued a news release stating,
City Council Members at a hearing . . . discovered that Administration officials no 
longer use a 1998 Memorandum of Understanding that transferred school safety 
??????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ?????????? ??? ??????????????? ????? ?????????????? ??? ??????? ????????? ???
solve disputes in school safety situations.
 Press Release, Peter F. Vallone, Jr., City Council Chair, Public Safty Comm., Getting on the Same 
Page on School Safety (Oct. 11, 2007).
146. See Testimony of Deputy Chancellor Grimm, supra note 145; Letter from NYCLU to Michael 
Bloomberg, N.Y.C. Mayor, Joel Klein, Chancellor, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., & Raymond Kelly, N.Y.C. 
Police Comm’r, supra note 145.
147. See Letter from Donna Lieberman & Udi Ofer, to Michael Bloomberg, N.Y.C. Mayor, Joel Klein, Chancellor 
of N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ. & Raymond Kelly, N.Y.C. Police Comm’r, regarding the MOU remaining in effect 
(June 16, 2009), available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/NYCLULetteronMOUextension.6.16.09.pdf; see 
also Philissa Cramer, City Secretly Renewed Police Control Over School Safety in 2003, GothamSchools (June 
26, 2009, 5:02 PM), http://gothamschools.org/2009/06/26/city-secretly-renewed-police-control-over-
school-safety-in-2003/; Press Release, NYLCU, Secret Agreement between NYPD and DOE over Police in 
Schools yet another Symptom of Broken System (June 17, 2009), http://www.nyclu.org/news/secret-
agreement-between-nypd-and-doe-over-police-schools-yet-another-symptom-of-broken-system.
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Memorandum of Understanding transferred to the NYPD the responsibility to 
recruit, hire, train, and deploy school safety officers,148 and to enforce the state’s 
criminal laws as well as the rules of the Board of Education, which includes the New 
York City discipline code, the vast majority of which concerns activities that are 
minor and non-criminal.149 Similarly, a 2007 NYPD training manual for school 
safety officers explicitly states that police personnel in schools have the authority to 
enforce school discipline.150 Likewise, on June 11, 2007, NYPD Commissioner Ray 
Kelly sent a letter to New York City Council Member and Chair of the Education 
Committee Robert Jackson indicating that the duties of school safety officers include 
“removing unruly students” and “enforc[ing] the rules and regulations” of the 
“Student Disciplinary Code.”151
 The delegation of the enforcement of school disciplinary rules to school safety 
officers raises serious Fourth Amendment concerns.152 The Fourth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures 
by police personnel,153 including school safety officers.154 The Fourth Amendment 
protects individuals against arbitrary invasions of their security and privacy by 
government officials,155 and generally requires that searches and seizures be made 
pursuant to a warrant based upon probable cause.
 Current NYPD policies and practices have resulted in students being seized and 
arrested by law enforcement personnel without probable cause of a crime and in 
148. See MOU, supra note 32, at 6.
149. Id. at 10. (“[T]he NYPD . . . is hereby authorized to enforce rules, regulations, or procedures of the 
Board and its schools which are subject to implementation by superintendents and principals in 
furtherance of school security.”).
150. NYPD Sch. Safety Div., NYPD School Safety Agent Duties and Responsibilities: A Guide 
for DOE and NYPD Personnel 7 (2007), http://corlears56-building council.wikispaces.com/file/
view/SSA’s+Duties+%26+Responsibilities.pdf (listing the responsibilities of each position within the 
borough command structure, including a level 1 school safety officer: “On behalf of the DOE, SSA’s 
will enforce the rules and regulations governed by the Chancellor’s Student Disciplinary Code.”).
151. Letter from Raymond W. Kelly, N.Y.C. Police Comm’r to Hon. Robert Jackson, Chairman of Educ. 
Comm., N.Y.C. Council, supra note 80.
152. Other constitutional concerns, which are beyond the scope of this article, raised by these practices are 
questions regarding what level of suspicion is required for a school safety officer to engage in a search of 
a student (the author would argue that the standard applied by the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), is too low and that the traditional standard of probable cause should apply) 
and when a school safety officer-student encounter rises to the level of a custodial interrogation 
triggering Miranda warning requirements, see J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
153.   The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
154. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment governs 
“all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security.” Id. at 19.
155. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
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violation of the Fourth Amendment. A person is seized under the Fourth Amendment 
when the officer “by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or 
restrains [the person’s] freedom of movement, through means intentionally applied.”156 
When an officer’s intent to restrain or an individual’s submission to authority is difficult 
to decipher, then the courts will consider whether “in view of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free 
to leave.”157 Police personnel detaining a child who has not engaged in criminal activity 
(for example, by handcuffing a five-year-old for throwing a temper tantrum) violates 
the Fourth Amendment, even if the child is never processed through the juvenile or 
criminal justice system.158
 The MOU also fails to consider the complexity of school-based incidents that 
could be considered both normal childish misbehavior as well as minor illegal 
activity. In particular, the MOU does not address situations that could technically be 
considered a violation of the Penal Law but that may not require a law enforcement 
response. For example, should a minor hallway disturbance be considered disorderly 
conduct leading to a summons or an arrest or should it be considered childish 
misbehavior resulting in after-school detention? Who should decide these questions 
and what factors should be taken into consideration? As a result of these unanswered 
questions, students in New York City are subject to arrests and summonses for minor 
illegal incidents (such as disorderly conduct) that should be treated by pedagogical 
staff or social workers and guidance counselors, and not by police personnel or the 
criminal justice system.
 The deficiencies contained in the MOU have led to principals in New York City’s 
public schools having little to no authority to supervise or regulate the behavior of 
5400 police personnel in the schools. Ernest Logan, president of the Council of 
Supervisors and Administrators, the union that represents principals in New York 
City, testified before the New York City Council in 2007 to this point and the lack 
of control that principals feel when it comes to maintaining safety in their schools, as 
well as confusion caused by the presence of police personnel in the schools without 
an adequate governance structure.
156. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991), Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n.16, and Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 
597 (1989)). An illegal seizure and arrest take place when an individual can demonstrate that “(1) the 
defendant intended to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff 
did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Posr v. 
Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 97–98 (2d Cir. 1991) (“An arrest . . . may occur even if the formal words of arrest 
have not been spoken provided that the subject is restrained and his freedom of movement is restricted.”). 
If a law enforcement officer has probable cause of a crime, then the arrest was privileged. Weyant v. Okst, 
101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that probable cause to exist there must be “knowledge or 
reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of 
reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime”).
157. See Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 255 (quoting United States v. Mendhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
158. See Rarick v. DeFrancesco, 94 F. Supp. 2d 279, 287 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the handcuffing of 
an individual to a wall constituted an arrest).
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My members who are the principals and the assistant principals in the schools 
feel that they cannot direct [School Safety Agents] who are providing the 
safety and security in their buildings. . . . 
 Now, the [New York City Schools] Chancellor has said principals are 
empowered. Well, it’s interesting, we’re now empowered over everything but we 
can’t say anything to the School Safety Agent159 about what we want them to do.
. . . .
 Every incident is unique, but I am truly troubled by the fact that we are 
criminalizing our children, because I heard today also that the School Safety 
Agent decides whether it is a crime or not. Now, maybe I’m a little confused 
by that. I know there is a principal of a school, two second graders playing in 
the school yard. The game gets heated, Jonnie hits Michael, Michael winds 
up with a bloody nose, the School Safety Agent observed that. Is that a crime? 
Are we now going to arrest the child who hit the other kid with the bloody 
nose? I don’t think so.
. . . .
 We believe that principals and assistant principals are in charge of their 
buildings and must have more direct control and supervision of safety agents.160
Unfortunately, schools receive little guidance from the DOE on how to ensure that 
law enforcement officials do not become school disciplinarians.
159. Many individuals, including those within the Bloomberg administration, refer to school safety officers 
as school safety agents. However, the MOU that established the NYPD’s School Safety Division refers 
to the police personnel in the schools as “school safety officers,” which is the term used in this article. It 
also is a more accurate term both because it ref lects the language of the MOU and because it correctly 
represents their powers as peace officers. See MOU, supra note 32, at 5.
160. Joint Hearing on School Safety Before the Comm. on Educ., Comm. on Public Safety, & Comm. on Juvenile 
Justice, 2006–2009 Sess. N.Y.C. City Council 178–82 (Oct. 10, 2007) (testimony of Ernest Logan, 
President, N.Y.C. Council of Sch. Supervisors & Adm’rs). In New York City, the main nongovernmental 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????? ??? ???? ????????????????? ??????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
this article has had numerous conversations with the leadership of the union, and in particular with 
union president Gregory Floyd, about the roles and responsibilities of school safety officers. In 2008, 
Mr. Floyd agreed to be interviewed by the author, in-person and on the record in his New York City 
office, to discuss his views on school safety in New York City, including the problems facing school 
safety officers. According to Mr. Floyd:
[The city needs to] clearly define for [DOE] staff, administrators at schools and 
teachers the guidelines under which they have to operate. And when they call school 
safety, for whatever the reason, they have to step back. Otherwise, do not call the 
School Safety Agents because the child will not take gum out of his mouth, the child 
will not take off his hat or her hat, [or because] the child will not sit down in the 
classroom. Those situations should be dealt with by the principals, the deans, and the 
teachers. If you call the School Safety Agents, you run the risk of having problems 
escalate in those cases.
 Interview by Udi Ofer with Gregory Floyd, President, Teamsters Local 237, in N.Y.C, N.Y. (July 7, 
2008).
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 B. Dramatic Growth of Suspensions in New York City Schools
 During the same period that the number of police personnel grew significantly in 
New York City schools, and policing tactics were introduced into the school 
environment, the number of suspensions also grew dramatically. According to a January 
2011 report by the New York Civil Liberties Union, from 1999 to 2009, the number of 
suspensions served each year in New York City schools nearly doubled, despite a 
decreasing student population.161 During that period, students served 449,513 
suspensions, missing more than 2.2 million days of regular school instruction.162
 In New York City, the Citywide Standards on Discipline and Intervention, also 
known as the “discipline code,” regulates the type of student activities that may be 
subject to a suspension.163 While some of the activities that mandate a suspension are 
governed by state and federal laws,164 school districts such as New York City have 
significant leeway in formulating their discipline code and deciding on appropriate 
interventions to address student misbehavior. For example, districts may choose to 
mandate peer mediation, guidance counseling, and conflict resolution programs as 
ways to address the vast majority of student misbehavior.
 New York City has taken advantage of this discretion to move in the opposite 
direction by increasing substantially the number of infractions listed in the discipline 
code and the number of those infractions that may or must result in a suspension. 
From 1998–2001, the New York City Discipline Code listed thirty-eight infractions, 
twenty-four of which could result in a suspension, and seven of which mandated a 
suspension.165 By 2008, the Discipline Code listed sixty-three infractions, fifty-one of 
which could result in a suspension, and twenty-nine of which mandated a suspension.166 
161. NYCLU Suspensions Report, supra note 4, at 5. The report analyzed data that had never before been 
made publicly available, and came in response to public records requests filed and appealed by the 
author over a two-year period. For additional information on the report, see Fernanda Santos, Sharp 
Rise in Suspensions at City’s Schools is Cited, NY. Times, Jan. 27, 2011, at A29, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/01/28/nyregion/28suspend.html; Rachel Monahan, Report Says Special Education 
and Black Students More Likely to Face Suspensions in School, N.Y. Daily News, Jan. 27, 2011, at 12, 
available at http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-01-27/local/27737935_1_suspensions-student-
infractions-black-students; Anna Phillips, City Schools are Suspending More Students, and for Longer, 
GothamSchools (Jan. 27, 2011, 5:49 PM), http://gothamschools.org/2011/01/27/city-schools-are-
suspending-more-students-and-for-longer/.
162. NYCLU Suspensions Report, supra note 4, at 5–6. New York City rarely expels students but frequently 
suspends them for long periods of time that in other jurisdictions would be considered an expulsion. In 
New York City children cannot be expelled until they have reached the maximum compulsory 
attendance age of seventeen. Therefore, during long-term suspensions, students attend alternative 
learning centers, also known as suspension sites. Students may be suspended for an entire school year 
but not be counted as being expelled.
163. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., Citywide Standards of Intervention and Discipline Measures: The 
Discipline Code and Citywide Bill of Student Rights and Responsibilities, K-12 at 1 (2011), 
http://schools.nyc.gov/RulesPolicies/DisciplineCode/default.htm.
164. See 20 U.S.C. § 7151; see also N.Y. Educ. Law § 2801 (McKinney 2011).
165. NYCLU Suspensions Report, supra note 4, at 11.
166. Id.
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Nearly half of all infractions mandated a suspension, and eighty-one percent of the 
listed infractions could have resulted in a suspension, including minor misbehavior 
such as being insubordinate or using profane language.167 That same year, 
unsurprisingly, also saw the most suspensions.168
 Zero tolerance infractions grew at the highest rate. In 1998, there were seven 
infractions that mandated a suspension.169 In the 2002–2003 school year, the year 
that Mayor Bloomberg took control over city schools, there were fourteen zero 
tolerance infractions, but by the 2007–2008 school year there were twenty-nine zero 
tolerance infractions.170 In 2010, largely in response to concerns raised by advocates, 
the number of zero tolerance infractions dropped to twenty-one offenses, still a two 
hundred percent increase from 1998, and a fifty percent increase from when Mayor 
Bloomberg took office.171
 As the number of suspendable infractions grew, so did the number of suspensions, 
despite a decreasing student population. In the 2002–2003 school year, the same 
year that Mayor Bloomberg took control of New York City schools, students served 
31,879 suspensions.172 By the 2008–2009 school year, students served 73,943 
suspensions, an increase of 132%.173
 Long-term suspensions also increased significantly, and comprised a larger 
percentage of overall suspensions. Long-term suspensions increased by 150% from 
the 1999–2000 school year to the 2008–2009 year (from 6493 to 16,232).174 While 
long-term suspensions comprised fifteen percent of all suspensions in 1999–2000, by 
2008–2009 they comprised twenty-two percent of all suspensions.175
 Black children bore the brunt of the increasing reliance on suspensions. While 
black children represented thirty-three percent of the student population during this 
period, they represented fifty-three percent of all suspensions and fifty-eight percent 
of long-term suspensions.176 Black students also represented the largest percentage of 
students with multiple suspensions.177 For example, more than fifty-six percent of 
children who served six or more suspensions in a school year were black.178 Moreover, 
167. Id. 
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 15.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 17.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 18–19.
177. Id. at 19.
178. Id.
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black students represented fifty-five percent of all suspensions for subjective offenses, 
such as engaging in disruptive or disrespectful behavior.179
 Students with special needs were also disproportionately suspended, despite 
federal protections for students with disabilities who are subject to school disciplinary 
actions.180 From 1999–2009, students with disabilities served close to thirty percent 
of suspensions in New York City public schools and were four times more likely to be 
suspended than students without disabilities.181 Students with learning or emotional 
disabilities served eighty percent of those suspensions, despite comprising half of the 
population.182 Black students with disabilities were also disproportionately suspended, 
representing thirty-six percent of the population of students with disabilities but 
fifty-three percent of suspensions.183
 The day after the NYCLU released its report finding that students with special 
needs were much more likely to be suspended, the New York Daily News obtained an 
internal Department of Education memo that had warned officials back in 2008 about 
school officials’ over-reliance on suspensions as a way to address disciplinary problems 
among children with special needs.184 Staff members of suspension sites in the Bronx 
prepared the November 2008 memo to raise concerns about the fact that approximately 
forty percent of the students at Bronx suspension sites had special needs.185 The memo 
quoted principals and teachers complaining that they did not receive enough support 
and guidance to address misbehavior by children with special needs.186
 It is likely that the increase in police presence and tactics in the schools, which 
took place during the same period as the increase in suspensions, contributed 
significantly to the dramatic increase in the number of suspensions in New York City 
schools. Too often police personnel in the schools, as well as security technologies 
such as metal detectors, lead to confrontations with students that result not only in 
wrongful arrests, but suspensions as well. Take, for example, Yvette, who, while 
trying to pick up her sister from a classroom in a school that they both attended, was 
handcuffed and arrested after engaging in a verbal dispute with a school safety officer 
179. Id. An illustration of this concern is found in the case of thirteen-year-old black student at Junior High 
School 190 in Queens, who was suspended for bringing a souvenir baseball bat to school. Four white 
children also played with the bat, yet the black student was the only one suspended. Monahan, supra 
note 161.
180. Federal law recognizes that students with disabilities may have greater behavioral problems and 
therefore affords additional protections to students with disabilities under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 20 U.S.C § 1415 (2006).
181. NYCLU Suspensions Report, supra note 4, at 3, 20.
182. Id. at 20.
183. Id. This statistic only applies to the years 1999–2008 because the Department of Education stopped 
releasing such disaggregated data after 2008.
184. Rachel Monahan, Officials Were Given Advance Warning on Special-Ed suspensions, Memo Shows, N.Y. 
Daily News, Jan. 28, 2011, at 16.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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who blocked her way to the classroom.187 While Yvette was released from police 
custody after seven hours, she was then recommended for a year-long superintendent 
suspension.188
III. GROWING EVIDENCE OF THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF ZERO TOLERANCE
 Though zero tolerance resonates politically and has proliferated across the nation, 
numerous studies have demonstrated that it is ineffective as a corrective measure and 
has a demoralizing effect on the student body.189 These studies have found that (1) 
zero tolerance policies create an unwelcoming school environment for all students, 
leading to feelings of detachment from school and a greater willingness to leave the 
school environment;190 (2) students who are suspended tend to be suspended 
repeatedly, until they either drop out or are pushed out of school by overwhelmed 
and under-resourced educators;191 and (3) zero tolerance tends to be implemented in 
a discriminatory manner: it is enforced more often against male students, students of 
color, students with disabilities, and students from low-income households.192
 Critics of zero tolerance argue that these policies lead to injustices against 
children, and that the mandatory punishments fail to correct misbehavior because 
they focus solely on the punishment and not on the learning opportunities that could 
result from alternative responses to student misbehavior.193 Moreover, critics argue 
that zero tolerance policies perpetuate the “school to prison pipeline,” a phenomenon 
whereby students from certain communities are removed from school and are pushed 
either directly (through arrests) or indirectly (through suspensions and other policies 
that lead to an unwelcoming school environment, such as untreated bullying) into 
the juvenile and criminal justice systems. Children who are removed from the 
learning environment, even for a few days, are more likely to drop out, use drugs, 
face emotional challenges, become involved with the juvenile justice system, and 
develop criminal records as adults.194 At-risk students in particular become more 
187. NYCLU Suspensions Report, supra note 4, at 14.
188. Id.
189. See APA Report, supra note 6; Advancement Project, Test, Punish and Push out: How “Zero 
Tolerance” and High-Stakes Testing Funnel Youth into the School-to-Prison Pipeline 
(2010); NYCLU Suspensions Report, supra note 4; David Richart et al., Building Blocks for 
Youth, Unintended Consequences: The Impact of “Zero Tolerance” and other Exclusionary 
Policies on Kentucky Students (2003) [hereinafter Building Blocks for Youth]; Zero 
Tolerance, Zero Evidence, supra note 6; Amy C. Nelson, The Impact of Zero Tolerance School Discipline 
Policies: Issues of Exclusionary Discipline, 37:4 Communiqué (Nat’l Ass’n of Sch. Psychologists), Dec. 
2008, http://www.nasponline.org/publications/cq/mocq374impact_zero_tolerance.aspx.
190. See Nelson, supra note 189.
191. See Advancement Project, supra note 21, at 12.
192. See Building Blocks for Youth, supra note 191, at 8. 
193. See Zero Tolerance, Zero Evidence, supra note 6, at 7.
194. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline (2005), 
http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/Dismantling_the_School_to_Prison_Pipeline.pdf; see also 
Criminalizing the Classroom Report, supra note 5; NYCLU Suspensions Report, supra note 4.
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alienated from school, placing them in a greater risk of delinquent behavior and 
eventual incarceration.195
 The American Psychological Association (APA) commissioned a Zero Tolerance 
Task Force in 2006 to study the evidence on the effects of zero tolerance on student 
behavior and achievement.196 The APA found that removing a misbehaving student 
from school does not result in a safer school environment for other students.197 In 
fact, data on school climate shows that schools that have a higher rate of suspension 
and expulsion also have less satisfactory school climate ratings and spend a 
disproportionate amount of school and staff time on disciplinary matters rather than 
academic performance.198 Studies have also found “a negative relationship between 
disciplinary exclusion and measures of achievement.”199 Schools that rely more heavily 
on exclusionary discipline demonstrate less educational achievement, even when 
controlling for other factors such as student demographics.200
 Moreover, there is little evidence to support the proposition that zero tolerance 
policies actually improve individual student behavior.201 On the contrary, there is 
strong evidence to support the conclusion that zero tolerance policies are ineffective 
in either shaping the future misbehavior of the subject of a removal or leading to the 
greater academic success of offenders. Studies have consistently shown that as many 
as forty-two percent of suspensions are of repeat offenders.202 Some studies have 
shown that a suspension is the primary predictor of future suspensions,203 and past 
suspensions have been among the greatest predictors of school dropout.204 While 
school suspensions are effective in removing a misbehaving student from school, 
there is little to no evidence to suggest that they prevent such students from acting 
out, yet they do serve as predictors of future suspensions and failure to graduate.
 Zero tolerance also tends to be applied in a discriminatory manner, despite the 
appearance that the mandatory nature of the policy would eliminate any 
discriminatory application. The APA reviewed the question of whether zero tolerance 
policies increase the consistency of school discipline, and concluded that black 
195. APA Report, supra note 6, at 5.
196. Id. at 3.
197. Id. at 4, 44–48.
198. See id. at 4–5, 47.
199. Id. at 44.
200. Id. at 44–48.
201. Zero Tolerance, Zero Evidence, supra note 6, at 13.
202. See Virginia Costenbader & Samia Markson, School Suspension: A Survey of Current Policies and Practice, 
78 Nat’l Ass’n of Secondary Sch. Principals Bull. 103, 104–05 (1994); see also Christine Bowditch, 
Getting Rid of Troublemakers: High School Disciplinary Procedures and the Production of Dropouts, 40 Soc. 
Probs. 493, 499 (1993) (calculating 35.2% repeated school violations).
203. See generally Tary Tobin & George Sugai, Patterns in Middle School Discipline Records, 4 J. Emotional & 
Behav. Disorders 82, 87–94 (1996); APA Report, supra note 6, at 5.
204. Gary Wehlage & Robert Rutter, Dropping Out: How Much Do Schools Contribute to the problem? 87 
Tchrs. C. Rec. 383, 385 (1986).
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students and students with disabilities are disproportionately disciplined under zero 
tolerance policies.205 This occurs despite the lack of data that supports that black 
students exhibit a higher rate of misbehavior than white students.206 Instead, the data 
demonstrates that black students may be disciplined for more subjective infractions, 
such as disrespect and loitering while white students appear to be referred more 
frequently for objective offenses, such as smoking.207 A contributor to such 
disproportionality appears to be cultural incompetence and the lack of adequate 
training and support for teachers.208
 Finally, similar concerns have been raised regarding an aggressive police presence 
in schools, which has been found to damage the credibility and effectiveness of 
pedagogical employees, alienate students, and interfere with normal adolescent 
development.209 Schools with a greater police presence also tend to have a 
disproportionate number of students of color and students on free and reduced lunch 
programs.210 Studies have found that students of color are more likely to be arrested at 
school than white students. In Florida, black youth make up twenty-two percent of 
the state’s juvenile population but represent forty-seven percent of school-based 
delinquency referrals.211 A study of police practices in schools in Hartford, Connecticut 
found that black and Latino students made up twenty-four percent of the student 
population but sixty-three percent of school-based arrests.212 In the Denver Public 
Schools between 2000 and 2004, Latino and black students had a seventy percent 
greater likelihood than white students to be disciplined, including ticketed.213
205. APA Report, supra note 6, at 55–65; see also NYCLU Suspensions Report, supra note 4.
206. APA Report, supra note 6, at 58.
207. Id. at 58–59; NYCLU Suspensions Report, supra note 4, at 19; see also Anna C. McFadden et al., A 
Study of Race and Gender Bias in the Punishment of School Children, 15 Educ. & Treatment Child. 140 
(1992) (considering demographic differences in rates of referral for disciplinary action and finding that 
males represented over seventy-five percent of all discipline referrals, that black students received more 
corporal punishment and were suspended from school more frequently, and that black students were 
disproportionately disciplined); Steven R. Shaw & Jeffrey P. Braden, Race and gender bias in the 
administration of corporal punishment, 19 Sch. Psychol. Rev. 378 (1990) (studying disciplinary practices 
to see if there is evidence of race and gender bias-corporal punishment practices and finding a small and 
statistically significant relationship between race and corporal punishment, and a larger statistical 
relationship between gender and corporal punishment).
208. APA Report, supra note 6, at 58.
209. See, e.g., Kathleen Nolan, The Impact of Order-Maintenance Policing on an Urban School Environment: An 
Ethnographic Portrait, 19 Voices Urb. Educ. 18, 24–25 (2008); Eve Tuck et al., Youth Researchers 
for a New Education System (2008).
210. APA Report, supra note 6, at 73; see also Criminalizing the Classroom Report, supra note 5.
211. Fla. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, Delinquency in Florida’s Schools: A Four Year Study 5 (2009).
212. ACLU & ACLU of Conn., Hard Lessons: School Resource Officer Programs and School-
Based Arrests in Three Connecticut Towns 36 (2008).
213. Advancement Project, supra note 21, at 8.
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IV. ALTERNATIVES TO ZERO TOLERANCE POLICING AND DISCIPLINE
 Schools throughout the nation have replaced zero tolerance discipline policies 
with a graduated system of discipline that recognizes early intervention and moderate 
responses to misbehavior. These approaches recognize that misbehavior must be 
addressed immediately or else it will lead to future disruptions or even violence, but 
address such misbehavior by replacing severe punishments with a graduated system 
of alternative responses and interventions.214
 In 2009, the NYCLU, the Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown 
University, and Make the Road New York released a report215 based on a one-year 
quantitative and qualitative study of six schools in New York City that had developed 
strategies to reduce school violence and achieve better graduation rates without 
resorting to zero tolerance policing and discipline while promoting a positive school 
climate.216 The six schools served at-risk student populations similar to schools in 
New York City that relied on heavy-handed policing and zero tolerance discipline.217 
Several of the schools were transfer schools that served students who fared poorly in 
other schools and had fewer credits and a history of disciplinary problems.218 Yet the 
schools had higher attendance and graduation rates, as well as dramatically lower 
numbers of criminal incidents and school suspensions.219 Moreover, the seven-year 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
214. Zero Tolerance, Zero Evidence, supra note 6, at 16.
215. The author of this article was the primary author of the report.
216. Udi Ofer et al., Safety with Dignity: Alternatives to the Over-Policing of Schools (2009) 
[hereinafter Safety with Dignity Report]. The six schools examined in the report were Progress 
High School for Professional Careers in Brooklyn, Urban Assembly School for Careers in Sports in the 
Bronx, Humanities Preparatory Academy in Manhattan, two schools in the Julia Richman Education 
Complex: Urban Academy and Vanguard High School in Manhattan, and Lehman High School in the 
Bronx. In 2010, the new principal at Lehman High School supported the installation of metal detectors, 
despite the number of serious incidents in the schools having decreased by thirty-six percent from the 
previous year. Fears about gang activities and fights led to the installation of metal detectors. See Anna 
Phillips, Bronx High School May Be the Last of Its Kind to See Scanners, GothamSchools (Apr. 28, 2010, 
6:34 PM), http://gothamschools.org/2010/04/28/bronx-high-school-one-of-the-last-of-its-kind-to-
see-scanners/. The six schools were chosen because they had no permanent metal detectors, had 
reputations for their positive learning environments, and served populations similar to that of the 
average New York City school with permanent metal detectors. The report identified several measures 
of success: higher graduation, attendance, and student stability rates, and low rates of suspensions, 
dropouts, absenteeism, as well as criminal and non-criminal incidents relative to schools serving 
comparable populations. The report also examined the eighty-nine New York City high schools with 
permanent metal detectors and the twelve schools that were identified in 2006 by the DOE and NYPD 
as “impact” schools. In-depth interviews were conducted with forty-eight school administrator, school 
safety officers, parents, students, teachers, guidance counselors, and social workers.
217. Safety with Dignity Report, supra note 216, at 12.
218. Humanities Preparatory Academy is a transfer school, serving students with the greatest needs who 
have had behavioral, emotional, or learning problems at other schools. Id. at 31. Urban Academy is 
another example of a transfer school. It accepts students who have failed at previous schools, and many 
of its students are overage or behind in credits. Id. at 35.
219. Id. at 12.
1405
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 56 | 2011/12
significantly higher than comparable schools.220 For example, in 2007, the four-year 
graduation rate at Humanities Preparatory Academy was nearly sixty-five percent, 
yet its seven-year graduation rate was almost ninety-three percent.221 At Urban 
Academy the four-year graduation rate was a very low thirty-seven percent, but the 
seven-year graduation rate was almost ninety-one percent.222
 The six schools highlighted in the report responded to student misbehavior by 
utilizing alternative strategies that focused on attempting to address the underlying 
problems that led to the misbehavior and formulating individualized plans to prevent 
future misconduct.223 Moreover, while the six schools did have school safety officers 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ???????????????????????????????224 The six schools provide real-life examples 
of how to maintain safety by relying on non-policing and non-zero tolerance tactics, 
while also maintaining the mission and integrity of the school environment.
 While the six schools employed unique strategies for maintaining a safe and 
nurturing school environment, there were several common themes among all of 
them.225 First, they all exhibited strong and supportive leadership, led not only by a 
principal but also by teachers and staff who were devoted to a common vision of 
creating a nurturing school community for all students.226 The leadership of these 
schools put in place mechanisms and organizational structures that anticipated 
disciplinary problems and were geared to reducing f lashpoints of confrontation and 
ensuring that when misbehavior inevitably arose, it was dealt with swiftly and 
through positive interventions.227
 Second, the six schools employed alternative approaches to addressing disciplinary 
problems that ensured educators, and not police personnel, enforced school discipline, 
including disciplinary infractions that may rise to the level of a minor illegal offense, 
220. Id. at 12–13.
221. Id. at 30.
222. Id. at 34. These schools are also good examples of the shortcoming of evaluating student achievement 
through the four-year graduation rate. Schools that serve at-risk populations and students with special 
needs should be rated by their student retentions levels and long-term graduation rates.
223. Id. at 12.
224. Id. at 17.
225. Id. at 15.
226. Id.
227. Id. Interestingly, Mayor Bloomberg has emphasized building strong leadership skills in principals and has 
even launched an initiative in December 2002 to support principals to take on greater leadership roles in 
their schools. Press Release, New School Safety Initiative, supra note 66. However, this emphasis on 
greater leadership by principals has not extended to principal authority over school safety matters. Safety 
with Dignity Report, supra note 216, at 16. Principals whom the authors of the report interviewed 
expressed great concern and frustration over the obstacles they faced from the Department of Education in 
their attempts to institute alternatives school safety tactics and structures. Id. The principal of one of the 
featured schools in the report, William Jusino of Progress High School, has even remarked: “You’d think 
the Department of Education would want to know all about us, but they don’t. . . . [W]e’re one of the best 
kept secrets in New York.” Id. at 43.
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such as disorderly conduct.228 They instituted policies and practices that ensured that 
educators, and not the police, were ultimately responsible for maintaining order in the 
classroom and hallways by making clear that educators have the final say.229 For 
example, educators and staff monitored the hallways and addressed matters such as 
cutting class, rather than schools safety officers.230 Some of these schools instituted 
alternatives, such as conflict resolution programs or fairness committees, which are 
charged with adjudicating violations of school rules and formulating appropriate 
responses, to secure the school environment.231 In these schools, the role of school 
safety officers was limited to acting as a last resort to deal with serious and immediate 
problems.232 Minor disciplinary infractions, such as disorderly conduct, loitering, 
profanity, and tardiness were handled exclusively by school officials. In effect, the six 
schools filled in the gap left by Mayor Bloomberg and the Department of Education 
by “establish[ing] clear rules of governance over school safety matters.”233
? ?????? ???????? ????? ????? ??????????????? ??????????????? ??????? ????? ??? ?????
???????????????????? ??? ???????? ??? ??????????? ???????????????????????????????????
than good to the educational environment of the school and actually led to greater 
dropout rates while providing a false sense of security.234 School administrators, 
parents, students, and teachers expressed a belief that the lack of metal detectors did 
not make their schools less safe but rather helped produce a school climate based on 
trust, respect, and dignity.235 This, in turn, led students to feel more committed to 
the school, and more positive and a safer school environment.236 Without metal 
detectors, there was a greater emphasis on trust and communication between students 
228. Safety with Dignity Report, supra note 216, at 17–19.
229. Id. at 17.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 18. Fairness committees consider minor infractions such as cursing or disrespect and even more 
serious matters such as fighting, vandalism, or cheating. Id. The committees are comprised of students 
but are usually led by teachers or social workers. These committees allow students to be a part of the 
disciplinary process, thus encouraging them to accept responsibility and ownership over maintaining a 
safe and positive school environment. The committee’s adjudicative process also provides educators and 
administrators f lexibility when handling infractions. Moreover, the process legitimizes the school’s 
response in the eyes of the student being judged. Id. at 20. According to testimony delivered in October 
2007 by the Department of Education, 800 teachers in New York City have been trained on conflict 
resolution programs. Joint Hearing on School Safety Before the Comm. on Educ., Comm. on Public Safety, & 
Comm. on Juvenile Justice, 2006–2009 Sess. N.Y.C. City Council 130–32 (Oct. 10, 2007) (testimony of 
Elayna Konstan, CEO, Office of Sch. & Youth Dev., N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.). This is less than one 
percent of the approximately 83,000 teachers in the New York City school system. Safety with 
Dignity Report, supra note 216, at 20.
232. Safety with Dignity Report, supra note 216, at 17.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 43.
236. Id. at 43.
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and school staff to ensure that weapons were not brought into the school, and if they 
were, that students felt comfortable reporting such infractions to school officials.
 Third, the six schools involve students in the process of revising the school’s 
individual code of conduct that supplements the citywide discipline code.237 This 
???????? ?????????? ??????????? ???? ??????? ??????????????? ???????? ?????????
allowing students and staff to revisit rules that may become counterproductive or 
that may have created unnecessary tensions or confrontations.238 This process also 
encouraged student ownership over and responsibility for school rules.239
 Fourth, several of the schools provided extensive support for students’ 
nonacademic needs, either through in-house services or in partnerships with 
community based organizations.240 These non-academic services included social 
services, mentoring programs, counseling services, community-service opportunities, 
family therapy, medical services, and even daycare centers.241
 Fifth, in these schools teachers were strongly supported and encouraged to think 
innovatively.242 Teachers were supported through professional development workshops, 
are given a voice in decisionmaking, and were encouraged to develop close relationships 
with their students and with their peers, thus forming strong community bonds.243 
One of the schools even had teacher retreats to which students are invited.244
 Finally, these schools emphasized a culture of trust and respect that formed the 
basis for all school policies and staff-student interactions and relationships.245 Even 
“bad students” were included in this emphasis.246 This included recognizing that there 
were no one-size-fits-all solutions for dealing with misbehaving students, but that a 
response must support the greater goal of building a school environment that 
emphasizes respect.247 Some of the schools created clear rules, such as “no personal 
attacks,” which was reinforced by school staff.248 Other schools established core values, 
as opposed to school rules, to create a sense of community and social responsibility.249 
Finally, some of the schools demonstrated this culture of respect by adjusting their 
237. Id. at 20, 43. For example, some classrooms allow students to listen to music as long as it does not 
interfere with their work or the work of other students. Id. at 20.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 20, 38.
242. See id. at 20–21.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 20.
245. Id. at 21.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 36–37.
249. Id. at 31. For example, they emphasize the values of respect for humanity, diversity, and intellect.
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curriculum to include culturally relevant discussions and materials that sought to 
integrate students’ backgrounds into the school’s academic work.250
 The policies and practices of the schools highlighted in the NYCLU report 
included components of a three-level model of prevention, intervention, and 
discipline that has been recognized by schools and researchers throughout the nation: 
primary prevention, which focuses on all students at a school by emphasizing a 
school-wide climate of tolerance and respect, bullying prevention,251 and conflict 
resolution; secondary prevention practices targeted at students who are at-risk for 
violence and misbehavior and provide students with tailored programs such as anger 
management and mentoring;252 and tertiary strategies that focus on students who 
have already engaged in misbehavior and that strive to minimize the future damage 
to the misbehaving student and others.253
 One alternative to zero tolerance that utilizes all three tiers is Positive Behavioral 
Intervention and Supports (PBIS), which focuses on creating a positive school culture 
as well as individualized behavioral supports through proactive interventions to 
anticipate, prevent, and respond to disciplinary problems.254 The approach is data 
driven, which also assists in its marketability to policymakers and education 
reformers, and continuously tracks the progress of interventions.255 This model has 
already been implemented in schools throughout the nation and has provided 
documentation of decreased rates of misbehavior and suspensions and improvements 
to school climates.256
250. Id. at 20–21.
251. APA Report, supra note 6, at 88–90. The APA Report examined the effects of untreated bullying on 
the school environment and recommended addressing bullying through school-wide, classroom, and 
individual programs. Id.
252. See id. at 90–92. The APA study recommended instituting threat assessment measures, which evaluate 
the underlying issues that lead to misbehavior, as a way to identifying at-risk students. Id.
253. See id. at 88, 92–94.
254. See id. at 94; Technical Assistance Ctr. on Positive Behav. Interventions, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., SWPBS Implementation Blueprint Version 13 (2010); George Sugai & Robert Horner, 
The Evolution of Discipline Practices: School-Wide Positive Behavior Supports, 24 Child & Fam. Behav. 
Therapy 23, 32 (2002) (emphasizing supporting student behavior manifested on a school-wide, 
classroom, non-classroom, and individual student level); Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports 
(PBIS), Nat’l Ctr. for Mental Health Promotion & Youth Violence Prevention, http://
www.promoteprevent.org/publications/ebi-factsheets/positive-behavioral-interventions-and-supports-
pbis (last visited Mar. 3, 2012); Rob Horner & George Sugai, School-wide Positive Behavior Support, 
Ctr. on Positive Behav. Support, www.pbis.org/common/pbisresources/presentations/robintro.ppt (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2012). Numerous studies have demonstrated the benefits of reinforcing desirable student 
behaviors. See, e.g., Khasu et al., supra note 20, at 4.
255. APA Report, supra note 6, at 94
256. See id. at 94–95. A key component of PBIS is a three-tiered behavioral support model, which focuses 
largely on preventing misbehavior. See Sugai & Horner, The Evolution of Discipline Practices, supra note 
257, at 37–38; Horner & Sugai, School-wide Positive Behavior Support, supra note 257. The first tier of 
primary prevention applies to approximately eighty percent of students and includes school-wide 
programs. Elizabeth Burmaster, State of Wis. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, Positive 
Behavioral Intervention and Supports (PBIS) in Wisconsin Schools 1–2 (2009). This includes 
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 An example of the tertiary prevention response is restorative justice, which was 
implemented by some of the schools profiled in the NYCLU report. Restorative 
justice is a dispute-resolution method that focuses on providing opportunities for all 
??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to the dispute.257 Such an approach is designed to allow for reconciliation between 
the perpetrator of an attack or incident and the victims of such behaviors, and to 
allow both sides to feel a sense of resolution and a greater sense of security.258 This 
model allows schools to gain a fuller understanding of the circumstances that led to 
a student’s misbehavior and also provides an opportunity to devise appropriate 
remedies for the conduct. Through these methods, which hope to repair as much as 
possible the relationship between the perpetrator of an attack and the victim, the 
likelihood of repeat offenses, as well as revenge attacks, is reduced.259
 The fairness committees established by Humanities Preparatory Academy 
provide a prime example of how a restorative justice program operates and its 
effectiveness.260 The committees are comprised of students and led by school staff 
that is charged with considering infractions and formulating solutions and responses. 
Here is how the process was described by a teacher in the school when the fairness 
committee convened in response to a student breaking a window at the school:
During that session, the members of the committee found out that the day 
before he broke the window, his family received notice that they were being 
kicked out of their shelter and had no place to go. While this did not fully 
excuse his actions, we were able to discuss more fully and fairly what the 
consequences should be, as well as discuss more constructive ways to deal 
with anger. We jointly decided that he needed to give back to the school 
community in some way. Knowing that it would be ridiculous to ask a student 
who was homeless to pay for the window, we all agreed he would help answer 
the phone after school for a month. In the meantime, his advisor and the 
school social worker were able to reach out to his family and offer support. If 
clearly teaching behavior expectations to students, setting common rules for the entire school 
community, and creating guidance programs. Id. The second tier of prevention creates systems to 
provide support for students with at-risk behaviors, which the approach identifies as about fifteen 
percent of the student population, and which includes social skills building and instructional programs. 
Id. The third tier of prevention is specialized for students with high-risk behaviors, which applies to 
approximately five percent of students, and includes wraparound services, intensive interventions, case 
management, and mental health programs. Id. Throughout this process data mechanisms are built and 
shared that allow for a close monitoring and evaluation of student behavior and progress. See SWPBS for 
Beginners, OSEP Ctr. on Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports, http://www.pbis.
???????????????????????????????????? ?????? ????????????? ???? ?????????????? ???? ??????????????????????
example, are there certain parts of the school or times of day or year when students misbehave the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????See id.
257. Restorative Justice, www.restorativejustice.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
258. Id. This is in contrast to zero tolerance policies, which remove a child from the school environment 
without attempting to address the underlying behaviors or even providing the victim of misbehavior a 
sense of security once the offender returns to school. See APA Report, supra note 6, at 91.
259. Id.
260. See Safety with Dignity Report, supra note 216, at 31–32.
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the fairness committee had been a systematic, rigid mechanism, we would not 
have been able to brainstorm these solutions.261
In addition to allowing for a better understanding of the underlying problems that 
led to the student’s misbehavior, the fairness committee structure allowed for the 
building of more supportive relationship between students and school staff, which is 
a vital component to creating better and safe school environments.262
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 Worries about being labeled soft on crime and concerns about a potential backlash 
have prevented many public officials from considering alternatives to zero tolerance 
policies. Yet New York City and other school districts can take steps to ensure that 
students learn and educators teach in a safe and supportive environment without the 
collateral consequences of pushing children out of school and into the streets or 
juvenile and criminal justice systems.
 First, principals and educators must have final authority over school discipline 
and safety, not the police. When misbehavior occurs in a school, it should be the 
principal’s responsibility to determine appropriate responses, and not the responsibility 
of police personnel.
 Second, police personnel should not be involved in the enforcement of school 
discipline rules, and only become involved in school safety matters that rise to the 
level of a serious criminal offense. Disciplinary problems such as disorderly conduct, 
loitering, and profanity, to name a few examples, should never be handled by police 
personnel, even if a violation of the penal law.
 Third, punishments should always be promulgated on a case-by-case basis, and 
not through a zero tolerance approach. Suspensions should only be used as a last 
resort following the exhaustion of other non-exclusionary attempts to address 
misbehavior by a student.
261. Id. at 18.
262. In 2004, the England and Wales Youth Justice Board released a report on its use of restorative justice 
programs in schools to reduce the number of infractions and bullying and to improve student attendance. 
Twenty-six schools had instituted restorative justice conferences to resolve incidents in schools involving 
physical or verbal altercations. According to the report, the vast majority of conference resulted in 
agreement and ninety-three percent of students reported that the process was “fair” and “ justice had 
been done.” Youth Just. Bd. for Eng. & Wales, Restorative Justice in Schools (2004), http://
www.yjb.gov.uk/Publications/Resources/Downloads/RJ%20in%20Schools.pdf. A similar 2002 study 
in two school districts in Colorado found that ninety-two percent of participants in restorative justice 
conferences felt that the process helped to create a safer school, ninety-one percent felt that the process 
held offenders accountable for their actions, and ninety-six percent felt satisfied with the outcome. Alice 
Ierley & Carin Ivker, Restoring School Communities: A Report on the Colorado Restorative Justice in Schools 
Program, 13 VOMA Connections 1 (2003), available at http://voma.org/docs/connect13insert.pdf. In 
2002, a Minneapolis school adopted a restorative justice program for a limited population: students 
recovering from drug addictions. As a result, the number of disciplinary problems had dropped, and 
students reported a greater sense of connectivity to the school community. Carol Chmelynski, Schools 
Find ‘Restorative Justice’ More Effective Than Expulsion, Sch. Bd. News, May 17, 2005.
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 Fourth, schools should adopt alternatives to punitive and exclusionary discipline, 
such as restorative justice practices and positive behavioral interventions and supports. 
The Department of Education should mandate trainings on these practices and 
encourage schools to implement them.
 Fifth, schools should hire more guidance counselors, social workers, and mental 
and medical health providers to handle students’ non-academic needs and to respond 
to misconduct. New York City schools employ 5400 police personnel, s3000 guidance 
counselors, and 1400 social workers. The allocation of resources should be re-shifted 
to place greater emphasis on relying less on police personnel to address discipline and 
behavior problems, and more on trained counselors and educators.
 Sixth, metal detectors should be discouraged and installed only as a last resort, 
for a limited period of time, and following community input and approval. Schools 
should review and attempt alternative safety mechanisms before installing metal 
detectors. Once metal detectors are installed, then schools should maintain data that 
will allow them to determine the impact of the metal detectors on the school 
environment. Annual evaluations should be conducted to determine whether metal 
detectors are still necessary.
 Finally, after implementing the above alternatives, schools that currently have 
police personnel in them should remove them from their campuses. Once a school 
implements a clear governance structure that directs principals and educators to be 
responsible for discipline and safety, limits the involvement of police personnel to 
serious criminal matters, implements proven alternatives to zero tolerance policies, 
and hires social and health providers to handle students’ needs, then permanently 
stationed police personnel will no longer be needed in schools.
